October 1985
Volume 12
Number 5

CURRENTS in theology and mission

Needed:
Wisdom and Courage

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CURRENTS IN THEOLOGY AND MISSION is published bimonthly, February, April, June, August, October, December by Christ Seminary — Seminex, a non-profit organization, 1100 East 55th Street, Chicago, IL 60615, to which all business correspondence is to be addressed. Annual subscription rate: $10 in the U. S. and Canada ($11.50 overseas). Two-year rate: $18.50 in the U. S. and Canada ($21.00 overseas). Three-year rate: $26.00 in the U. S. and Canada ($30.50 overseas). Second Class Postage Paid at Chicago, IL and at other mailing offices.

CURRENTS is indexed in Elenchus, IZBW, NTA, OTA, Religion Index I (formerly IRPL), Religious and Theological Abstracts, and Theologische Literaturzeitung.
(ISSN: 0098-2113)

October, 1985
Volume 12
Number 5

CURRENTS in theology and mission

Published by
Christ Seminary — Seminex
in cooperation with
Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago
Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary
Wartburg Theological Seminary

Note: Address all business correspondence to: *Currents in Theology and Mission,* 1100 E. 55th Street, Chicago, IL 60615.

Needed: Wisdom and Courage

At the end of each stanza of "God of Grace and God of Glory" (LBW 415), we pray for the virtues of wisdom and courage in order to face up to the challenge of our days. Wisdom comes from experience and reflection; it requires a correct appropriation of our tradition. Courage is innate or received; it can hardly be acquired. Both of these gracious gifts are desperately needed in every age if the church is to bring its evangelical bud to glorious flower.

All people of good will are agreed: 1) nuclear war would be a catastrophe to humankind and to planet earth, and 2) to wage such a war aggressively would be morally evil. The debate in our lead article asks whether a policy of nuclear deterrence is a moral way to prevent nuclear war. **Robert W. Jenson** thinks that a policy of nuclear deterrence is, in fact, immoral since it threatens the complete destruction of humankind after our own destruction is certain. It is an act of revenge for our own destruction. If God intends to make the fact of communicidal weapons the means of a new possibility of peace-making, that is *his* work, it cannot ever be ours. **Paul R. Hinlicky** argues that nuclear deterrence as the means by which we intend to avoid war is ethically imperative for us sinners as the lesser of two evils. If peace is to be achieved, he believes, it will only be politically and not through the "quick fixes" of the militarists or the pacifists. Nuclear or non-nuclear aggression is manifestly more evil morally than nuclear retaliation.

In the 16th century wisdom and courage abounded in the ministry of Johannes Bugenhagen. **Kurt K. Hendel** provides a biographical sketch of this great reformer on the occasion of his 500th birthday. Bugenhagen was an educator who advocated the use of the vernacular and the training of girls. Thanks to his organizational genius, the Lutheran Reformation enjoyed its greatest success in those areas where his impact was most direct. His famous "church orders" are at once constitutions and gold mines of practical advice. He modeled the pastoral office for us and for his most famous

parishioner, Martin Luther. He made aid to the poor a communal responsibility rather than an individualistic remedy associated with begging and almsgiving. No wonder that his achievements rank him with Luther and Melanchthon as one of the three greatest Lutheran leaders of the movement's first century.

Wisdom and courage are needed on Main Street, too. **Stephen Paul Bouman** observes that parish-based community organizations hope to extend the impact of God's people into public life. Such organizations must be broad-based, owned by the people, committed to power and action, governed by collective leadership, and ready to take on a variety of issues. He tells the history of community organizations in the Hackensack Meadowlands of New Jersey, an area where he serves as pastor. Community organization is an instrument for pilgrims and exiles who express their Christian love through politics and power. We do not have to choose between loveless power or powerless love. Lutherans need to rediscover a two-handed God as we seek to live as signs of the Kingdom.


Who displayed wisdom and courage more beautifully and more creatively than Johann Sebastian Bach? **Endel Kallas** points out that Albert Schweitzer brought about a new understanding of the Leipzig cantor in the 20th century. Bach was a poet whose medium of expression was music. This poetic or pictorial dimension of his musical artistry is in addition to his skills in melody, harmony, rhythm, and timbre. Artistic comparisons to Bach can better be made with Michelangelo than with Mozart or Handel. Schweitzer praised Bach for translating biblical texts and imagery into musical compositions.

Whether it is the evil hosts around us, or our own debilitating fear, or the human family's mad dash toward self destruction, it is always easier not to face up to the *real* challenges God has given us. Since the Kingdom's goal is always wholeness and peace, those who would serve the God of grace and glory know that missing this goal

is to miss the whole show. To live up to a heritage or to face up to this day begins with a prayer for those special gifts of wisdom and courage.

To us, God. To us!

Ralph W. Klein
Editor



Can Deterrence by Justified As a Lesser Evil? A Debate

Paul R. Hinlicky
Church in Society
Lutheran Church in America, New York, New York

Robert W. Jenson
Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, PA

Editor's note: The following debate begins in Part I with each participant stating his case or criticizing what he perceives to be the case of his dialogue partner. Parts II and III have the two debaters respond to what their counterpart actually said. The debate is very lively! —though there is intellectually difficult talk of means and ends, of communicidal war (= war that would bring death to the entire world community), of moral and natural evil (= sins and disasters), of middle axioms, and other technical terms of professional ethical discussion.

The arms race and the threat of nuclear war are without doubt *the* ethical questions of our era, and so we invite and urge our readers to join our disputants in struggling to determine what is the will of God for our time "when nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented."

Part IA: Opening Statement by Paul R. Hinlicky

Nuclear Deterrence Remains Necessary as the Lesser of Evils

Nuclear deterrence is founded upon the politically crucial observation that *no one can win a nuclear war.* A reasonable prospect for military victory has always been a decisive temptation to aggression. Since no one, however, will dominate an incinerated world, the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a powerful constraint against this temptation. Nuclear weapons deter aggression, one's own as well as the other's.

Doctrines of deterrence are old. Nuclear deterrence, however, is new and unique. The goal in classical deterrence doctrine was to project the credible ability and willingness to retaliate with such force as to deter in advance an aggressor. Nuclear deterrence involves a revolution in the relation of "ends" and "means" with respect to classical deterrence theories. What deters in nuclear deterrence is not either side's projection of power but both sides' recognition of the catastrophe of a nuclear war; power projection, which had been *the goal* in classical deterrence, becomes in nuclear deterrence *the means* of maintaining a balance in which both sides are vulnerable—and thus deterred. Even so, competition in power projection is inherently destabilizing.

If this description of nuclear deterrence is apt, the prudent thing to do politically is to recognize the reciprocity of the nuclear deterrence relationship and militarily to negotiate a stabilization of nuclear deterrence at the lowest possible level of risk.

Since mass destruction weapons are

Nuclear deterrence has rested on a hidden axiom.

disinventable, we shall *either* learn to live together *or* we shall perish together. Either/or! Ancient enmities and new ones, however, rebel at the nuclear imperative that we learn to live together. Among such new enmities is the moralistic attack on nuclear deterrence. Perhaps unwittingly, moralism wants to evade what can never again be evaded in fact: our mutual nuclear vulnerability.

How is such an evasion possible? It is possible for technical, ethical, and theological reasons.

Technically, the evasion of the necessity of nuclear deterrence is possible because nuclear deterrence has rested on a hidden axiom, namely, that any war between nuclear powers would be a nuclear war. Up until recent years, neither side had any other means than nuclear with which to fight. That era, however, is passing. Technically speaking, the world is now becoming (to speak with savage irony) safe for post-nuclear war.

The evolution of exceedingly swift and incredibly accurate missiles, along with the development of lasers based in outer space (none of which need be mounted with mass destruction weaponry or be targeted in a way that would indiscriminately injure civilians) could undergird such a scenario. The nuclear deterrent to war would thus be undercut if a non-nuclear war with a reasonable prospect of victory could be fought. Conceivably missiles targeted at bridges, bases, and communication centers could be exchanged for months, a devil's chess match, surrealistically immune in surgeon-like precision from inflicting collateral damage.

This technical possibility can be envisioned only by means of a preposterous evasion. Setting aside the monstrous costs, financial and human, of such a "post-nuclear" militarization, nuclear weapons will only have been pushed to the background; the resort to them cannot, in fact, be precluded. Nuclear deterrence depends on observing the fact of mutual vulnerability; nuclear deterrence is only apparently discredited by an "illusion of technique"—that a defense can really be built that relegates nuclear weapons to the background.

Will the technical illusion become compelling? It may, if it promises to deliver us from the *ethical* dilemma of threatening mass nuclear destruction in order to prevent mass destruction. When President Reagan went on national television in the spring of 1983 to pitch "the Strategic Defense Initiative" (a.k.a. "Star Wars"), a *resolution of the ethical dilemma of nuclear deterrence was not the least of the promises attached to this new gospel.*

If there is such a thing as "Christian" ethics, it derives completely from the proclamation that a human being is justified by faith *alone,* and correlatively, that a human being who can *only* be justified by faith is and remains radically a sinner. No Christian moreover believes this unless it is believed to be true for the



whole world. The fundamental contribution of the church to public morality is thus its public witness to the Gospel, i.e., its assault on works-righteousness, or as Reinhold Niebuhr put it, attestation to the fact that "there are no moral resolutions to moral dilemmas, only religious ones." A "Christian" ethic is only possible when it is clear that the law is given for sinners, and that its political task is not redemptive, but preservative —these being precisely *evangelical* insights.

Ethically, nuclear deterrence can be undermined by a kind of anthropological optimism, blind to human frailty and ignorant of human wickedness, for which "radical obedience" to abstract principles promises human redemption. The deluge of liberal Protestant moralism in the last several years (whether it argues from the kenosis of Jesus to unilateral disarmament, or from justification by faith to non-verifiability, or from the divine command, "You shall not kill", to pacifism) seems unable to live constructively in a moral dilemma. So, it is inclined to falsify our experience in one or another direction: We are a "Christian" nation, or, the Soviet regime is not really an enemy. We are good enough not to need nuclear deterrence, or the Soviets are not bad enough to aggress. Never does the reflection occur that perhaps we are bad enough to require the constraint of nuclear deterrence and the Soviets wise enough to desire a stable and mutual restraint.

The relevant command, "You shall not kill," is the word of the living God which claims us in the totality of our existence, both in our intentions and for the consequences of our acts. The command is relevant *just because* it is addressed to sinners, who are neither able nor willing apart from this word not to kill. The commandment is relevant as a political aid in the restraint of violence and an accusing revelation of all who, without its restraining aid, are deeply prone to violence. True obedience is, by evangelical definition, a matter of ongoing struggle.

For this reason, nuclear deterrence is also *ethically imperative*—a matter of struggling obedience to the command of God, not merely individually to avoid killing, but as political creatures to love the weak and to love the enemy.

It is evangelical wisdom to know that we, not the commandments, are the problem. Nuclear deterrence, with its immoral threat of mass murder as the *means* by which we *intend* to avoid war, is ethically imperative *for us sinners* as the lesser of *evils*. In the light of the divine command not to kill, it remains morally a greater evil to intend even "non-nuclear" war than conditionally to threaten retaliation (however catastrophic), and greater folly to fall into what will become anyway a nuclear war than soberly to avoid it with the means at hand.

The judgment of the law falls properly not on an impersonal system from which

Lesser of evils for the sake of the greater good.

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we can too easily divorce ourselves of personal and collective responsibility. The judgment falls squarely on us, Soviet and American alike, who really *need* nuclear deterrence in order to live together. *As collectives, we must change* if nuclear deterrence is to change.

Moralism devoid of evangelical insight into the human predicament is impotent really to help. Christian proclamation dare not save hope by telling lies. We cannot evade the nuclear morass. Faith in the *real* God who does rule the world, and in the miracle of his love for the weak and the enemy, inclines us rather to look and see what *really* is happening in the world, and precisely there to summon all to the courage of faith and the dignity of love.

A true theology does not falsify history but interprets it, yes, through a glass darkly, but nonetheless truly as the theater of God's glory in his sovereign acts of judgment and of mercy yet surpassing that same judgment. Such theology, enlightened with the eyes of faith, looks and sees the most real necessity of nuclear deterrence: The mighty No! of God to warfare and his providential purchase of time for us, and the even mighter Yes! of God. God's will for us, concretely, Americans and Soviets alike, with our threats of mass murder, is to live together.

So nuclear deterrence remains necessary as the lesser of evils *for the sake of* the greater good: God's will for peace between us. If spiritually we find this necessity disillusioning, indeed mortifying, *that is precisely the point.* Spiritually speaking, he who is God truly kills in order to make alive.

Part IB: Opening Statement By Robert W. Jenson

Confusions in the Nuclear Deterrence Debate

Each of these initial essays is written in ignorance of the content of the other. I do not, therefore, know whether what follows is in fact a *con* to Paul Hinlicky's *pro.* My target can be, for the moment, less specific. The "lesser-evil" argument is, of course, widespread in discussions of deterrence, but I fear it derives its popularity from the opportunities for evasion it provides. My first task in this essay is to identify a few such confusions.

If we are to choose the lesser evil in a particular case, the evils adduced must all be ranged at the same juncture of ethical consideration. So, in the language of means and ends, the evils among which we are to choose must all be ends, or all means, or all relations of means to ends, or whatever. But what is in the present case regularly done is to set "two evils" beside each other, communicidal war and the threatening of communicidal war as a means to avoid such war, and bid us choose. This is perfect nonsense and would be even if it were established that threats do in fact deter war. Purified of this sort of logical



slipping and sliding, lesser-evil discussions would work very differently than they commonly do.

Boners of the foregoing sort are often interwoven with one of another sort, a simple equivocation. "Evil" is an elaborately multivocal word. For our purposes, we must at least distinguish between natural and moral "evils," disasters and sins. If "evils" are to be compared, the same use of the word must persist through the argument. Communicide itself would be a disaster and not a sin, since its actual occurrence is not in our power; the sin would be the act intending that communicide shall occur. If I point a gun at you, supposing it to be loaded, pull the trigger, and nothing happens, the disaster of your death does not occur, but my sin does, and it is exactly the same sin as if you had died. Any and all arguments that balance the intention of communicidal war (sin) with the war's occurrence (disaster), as "evils," are thus primitive linguistic blunders: We will certainly hope that no wars at all occur, failing that, that small "conventional" wars occur, failing that, that a large "conventional" war occurs rather than a communicidal one; at each step hoping for the lesser natural evil. But if we wish to argue that deterrence, as a *moral* evil, should be *chosen* before other evils, the evils in question must also be moral evils. It is rarely specified what these might be.

Two additional confusions arise that are not matters of general logic, but specific to the historical case. Both are in the word "deterrence."

(1) It is hard to discuss deterrence in complete abstraction from the actual foreign policy now pursued under that label. But, by the latest poll, 81% of Americans are wrong about what that policy is. America does not merely threaten to retaliate with communicidal weapons to their prior use against us; it is *not* only or even chiefly Russian nuclear blackmail or aggression that we now "deter" with our threats. America officially threatens first use of communicidal weapons—the only nation on earth to do so—to defeat a "conventional" attack against us or any of our major allies, if that attack seems likely otherwise to succeed. It is first and foremost the "conventional" invasion of Western Europe that we now deter—we hope—with our communicidal threats. Now if we always remember, in weighing "deterrence" against other moral evils, that what most supporters of "deterrence" wish to support, and what the United States is in fact doing under that label, overlap only slightly, all is well. But such logical self-discipline is rare, in churchly discussions especially. I will here, until informed otherwise, assume that it is the "deterrence" we do not practice but might, rather than the one we do practice, that Paul Hinlicky proposes to defend.

(2) The second confusion is one to which an earlier study of Hinlicky's first

The "evil" in question must be a moral evil.

called my full attention. Since the knowledge of how to make communicidal weapons will not go away, we would all have to fear catastrophic retaliation from one another also in a world disarmed of actual communicidal weapons. There is therefore a sense of "deterrence" in which it names not a policy but a fact; we will go on in this sense deterring one another, willy-nilly. *This* "deterrence" is not a matter of argument; therefore the existence of this "deterrence" has no moral quality at all. It is the *policy* of "deterrence," the actual uttering of threats to destroy the adversarial community if they do such-and-so, with intent to carry out those threats, that is an act subject to ethical judgment and to argument about what ethical judgment is to be made. Almost never is this distinction sustained.

Now—if we eschew all these confusions, what is to be argued? The "evil" in question must be a moral evil: the policy of threatening the total destruction of the adverse community in retaliation for their destruction of ours. It is a maxim of every ethic, because it is fully intuitive: a threat to use force under such-and-such circumstances can be justified only if using that force under those circumstances can be justified. The actual object of our question about justification is therefore a scenario: the adverse communicidal weapons are launched; it is—so far as we know—all up with our half of humanity; do we now act to destroy the other half? "Pressing the button" performing the acts intended to do just that, is the moral evil than which lesser-evil justifiers of deterrence must specify a greater moral evil. In my experience, all utilize one or more of the above confusions to slide away before reaching this assignment. Even the Catholic bishops' letter, seduced by the bishops' staff, fails here. I will await Paul Hinlicky's paper with great curiosity.

Part IIA: First Rebuttal By Paul R. Hinlicky

Aggression as the Greater Evil

Robert Jenson does the church a service with his clarifying dissection of the moral obfuscations that becloud discussion of nuclear deterrence. In order to get on to the real point of contention between us, let me first show how his analysis undergirds my initial argument.

To begin where Jenson ends: Having rightly forbidden comparing apples and oranges, Jenson asks what *morally* is more evil than the retaliatory nuclear strike to which the policy of nuclear deterrence commits us. My entire argument presses to answer precisely this question: what is manifestly more evil *morally* than nuclear retaliation is aggression, nuclear (or non-nuclear). It is the height of folly moreover, to imagine that the United States (or the Soviet Union) unconstrained by nuclear deterrence would be immune from the temptation to aggress. What is new and unique



about nuclear deterrence is that it deters *one's own* aggression as well as the other's.

I share Jenson's conviction: "purified of logical slipping and sliding, lesser evil discussions would work very differently than commonly they do." The usual justifications of nuclear deterrence which "bids us choose" morally, as Jenson puts it, between "communicidal war and the threatening of communicidal war as a means to avoid such war" are, however, more than "nonsense." They are demagoguery which obscures the real choice to be made in an irrevocably nuclear world.

Given *the necessity* of nuclear deterrence as a fact (which Jenson acknowledges) but also the ethical imperative prudently to manage it, what is not an alternative is nuclear escapism, be it that of "post-nuclear" militarism or that of "selective nuclear pacificism." The real choice we face is the choice imposed upon us by the factual and ethical necessity for nuclear deterrence, namely, whether or not we shall learn to live together. And that question, if Scripture is to be believed, is the key to the riddle of history.

I wrote, "as collectives, we must change if nuclear deterrence is to change." Peace will be achieved neither by the technological "quick-fixes" of the militarists nor of the pacifists. If peace is to be achieved at all, it will be achieved politically. That states both what is the real choice and what is really a choice. I mean that *we can evade this real choice, and in so doing, really choose against the political task of learning to live together.* To choose for the political task (speaking concretely of the United States and of the Soviet Union) requires a spiritual resource which prudence alone lacks.

For these two nations represent to the world and understand themselves, in Reinhold Niebuhr's words, as "two secular religions of world redemption (which) are in conflict with one another." We may well choose to cling to this old emnity. If we are to choose instead the political task, we require the proclamation of a gospel good enough to bid us spiritually to die in order that God may make us alive again. This claim for the necessity of the gospel simply confesses that the gospel is true: "if there were a law that could make alive, then justification would be by the law."

Needless to say, it would help things immensely if the church believed its own gospel; but just because the gospel is true, its revelation of God's rule and promise of God's faithfulness does not depend on the church's response. *(Contra* Jenson, it was their Pelagianism, not their staff, which misled the Catholic Bishops).

Where then might my disagreement with Jenson lie? We are agreed in the need for analytical rigor and share a suspicion of moral evasiveness lurking behind intellectual sloth. I applaud his relevant distinction between moral and natural evil. Jenson, finally, is willing to

The struggle to manage nuclear deterrence is morally significant.

grant me the benefit of a doubt, that it is not current policies of deterrence I propose to defend, but some better one. I appreciate his generosity; but if I take this bait, a trap will justly spring on me and I will be found guilty of the very thing of which I disapprove: recourse to an imaginary zone of purity above the fray.

I have ruled out nuclear escapism; *mutatis mutandis,* all policy efforts to manage nuclear deterrence (no matter how corrupted, and/or muddled by double-mindedness) qualify as morally significant expressions of struggling obedience. The fact that such policy efforts may err morally is precisely why only the struggle to manage nuclear deterrence is morally significant. Nuclear escapism is morally irrelevant if not positively amoral. I mean that as a statement of what is the case: Nuclear escapism lives out of bounds, where there is neither responsibility for error nor a possibility of help. That is the ghostly nature of what exists as an evasion.

In short, Jenson's distinction between the deterrence we do practice and a presumably better one is true only in a most generalized sense: to take up political responsibility for nuclear deterrence is precisely to enter critically the policy debate on how best to manage it. That debate is the morally significant one.

To illustrate: Jenson rightly affirms that "it is hard to discuss deterrence in complete abstraction from the actual policy now pursued under that label." True enough, provided one remembers that inconsistency and murkiness of mind will appear here as elsewhere; that "actual foreign policy" is probably more reactively shaped than intentionally "pursued"; and that, in any event, what foreign policy ought to be is subject to on going debate. Our ability to do what we say, and our willingness to say what we do, in short, are sufficiently suspect to forbid too easy a correlation of rhetoric and reality. Jenson seems to take contemporary rhetoric at its word—words murky enough to begin with; he has been, I think insufficiently suspicious.

Jenson charges that NATO's "first use" policy aims to deter a "conventional" Soviet attack on Western Europe. Believing this rhetoric to be fact, Jenson's indictment manages to put John Foster Dulles in the dock—and to miss the ensuing thirty years. "Flexible response" (meeting a conventional assault on Western Europe at first conventionally) has been NATO doctrine *practically* since the sixties and *officially* for a decade. In the course of Jenson's untimely indictment of Dulles, he manages additionally to commit an analytical blunder of the sort he has inveighed against: he confuses, just as Soviet propaganda wants confused, all fission or fusion weapons with mass-destruction or communicidal weaponry.

NATO has rejected the "no first use" ploy because its anti-tank defense relies heavily, at this point, on small nuclear



artillery shells and the like. For NATO in reality to adopt "no first use" of *nuclear* weapons would be to dismantle any contemporary possibility of a limited defense, and therewith, to plunge itself headlong into the very immorality Jenson wants to protest: disproportionate reliance on communicidal weaponry to deter a conventional Soviet attack.

The point is not merely to refute a gross caricature of NATO policy, or for that matter to defend NATO's policy. It is rather to point out how terribly unhelpful such analysis can be. We can have no ethical clarity until we enter—responsibly before God—the nuclear morass. That is so because otherwise we do not have our feet firmly on the terrain through which morality need guide us.

This illustrates the issues on which, as I can best see, Jenson and I disagree. Jenson seems to believe that only actions over which we have control admit of ethical judgment. For that reason, he insists that the factual existence of nuclear deterrence "has no moral quality." That there is a distinction between what is imposed upon us and what we can control, what we suffer and what we do, the cross and our most real choice to flee it or to carry it, I do not deny. But as theologians of a gospel whose central invitation bids us to take up our cross, we cannot allow this distinction to become a dualism divorcing necessity and morality.

Such a divorce promises hopelessness. For necessity undisciplined by morality no less remains necessity. And if necessity prevails without morality, not only will we have lost our need of the gospel. We will have gained the demonic.

Part IIB: First Rebuttal
By Robert W. Jenson

The Irrelevance of Deterrence

With Paul Hinlicky's initial essay now before me, argument can be aimed at the actual position I am to meet. I will devote an initial section of this essay to direct examination of that position, then turn to some of my own convictions. As it turns out, it was expeditious to devote my own initial essay to the equivocations common in general discussion, since the argument presented by Hinlicky depends on at least two of those mentioned. I will consider first the more easily rectified.

Hinlicky has at least chosen a lesser evil himself, in his choice of which "deterrence" to propose: the deterrence which we as a nation might practice someday but now do not: threatening to respond in kind to a first communicidal attack on us. In the very title of his essay, however, he forgets how he has chosen; the policy he advocates cannot, of course, "remain," since it is not now in place. The mix-up is not trivial, for it enables advocates of purely second-strike deterrence to conceal from themselves just how visionary their own proposal is. Its adoption would withdraw the "nuclear umbrella' over Europe and

That we make threats is not historically inevitable or involuntary.

Japan, for the sake of which we created our nuclear arsenal in the first place and which remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy. The policy Hinlicky advocates in fact is as different from present policy, is as unlikely to be adopted, and is as pure a product of abstract ethical reflection, as any advocated by "moralists" like myself.

Advocates of purely second-strike deterrence can clean up this confusion without abandoning their position itself. But they would lose their polemical rhetoric, and their position would lose much of its appeal, perhaps even to themselves. It could no longer be presented as "realistic." Nor could it be presented as a continuation of present policy, which is commonly, if with little basis, thought to have "worked."

Hinlicky's other equivocation cannot be thus excised; the argument itself depends on it. The good which, in his account, mitigates the evil of deterrence, resides in the deterring which the nuclear powers will involuntarily do to each other, since the weapons cannot be disinvented. In *this* deterrence, we have a sheer historical fact, whose meaning we may debate but which we can no longer choose.

Hinlicky seems to regard the fact as a blessing of Providence, who has turned our evil intention to good, using it to restrain our warlike proclivities. It might be possible to read Providence differently in this matter, but let me grant Hinlicky's reading. About the deterrence that is simply a fact, there is nothing to argue and no choices among evils to be made—since it is indeed simply a fact. If all Hinlicky wishes to say is that we should recognize the fact and join in prayer that God use it for good, we may all agree and turn to more arguable topics.

But alas!—Hinlicky has no such straightforward proposal. Instead he wants to credit the good done by involuntary deterrence to a deterrence which consists in "threatening." And indeed it is these threatenings, to complete humankind's destruction in revenge for our own, whose evil needs some lessening. But that we *make* threats is not historically inevitable or involuntary. That we make deterrent threats is *not* the same as the deterring that Providence has brought to pass; it is decidedly an addition to that; it is optional policy. Deciding whether or not to threaten communicidal retaliation, we indeed face a choice whose moral quality can be debated and which might conceivably be justified as a lesser evil. But the present essay's sole effort to do this consists in a piece of smuggling, the attempt to transfer to the proposed active policy's account the good on deposit for a quite different "deterrence," the historical situation antecedent to and independent of all policy-choices.

So soon as the above is seen, it becomes apparent that Hinlicky's most accurate observations cut the way other than he supposes. Thus "projections of



force" are indeed always destabilizing in our situation, as he says. But the deliberate policy of uttering fearful threats is of course precisely an attempt to project force—if it is not, whatever would be? The conclusion must be: drop the *policy* of deterrence, the threatenings, and let the anyway-deterrent-situation take its course—praying this be beneficent. As to "disarmament," work that out as goes best, since for the deterrent *situation,* actual communicidal weapons are, as Hinlicky says, unnecessary. I concur.

Hinlicky does offer a suggestion as to what evil it is that "the immoral threat of mass-murder as the *means* by which we *intend* to avoid war" is supposed to be lesser than—and in this he does far better than his fellows. The greater evil would be "to intend" even conventional war, since this intent is to kill. But the "means" that actually deter war by Hinlicky's account, are an historical situation *we* cannot now intend as *means* at all; if this situation is means to deter war, it is God's means only. Moreover, *all* intentions of war are conditional, since surrender is always a means of avoidance. What Hinlicky's proposal actually presents for comparison, therefore, are a) the sincere threat to respond to our utter destruction by the utter destruction of the other half of humanity, and b) the sincere threat to respond to a lesser injury by lesser injury to the adversary. It would not be hard to judge that the former (a) is hardly an evil lesser than the latter (b).

One cannot avoid the impression that his argument regularly depends on attribution to ourselves of reliable capacity to distinguish innocence from concupiscence in our own will. Uttering threats in order to enforce our desire to remain intact is supposed to be one thing, a threat of "retaliation," and uttering threats in order to enforce our desire, say, to dominate Central America, is supposed to be another thing, a "projection of force" or an "intention of war"; and we are supposed to be able to tell when we are doing the one and when we are doing the other so as to be able to eschew the one precisely by embracing the other. This attribution seems at odds with the view of sin manifested in the essay. It is also at odds with all experience, which teaches that no nation ever used force except to defend its "vital interests," *as* it saw them.

So what is the real question? Step by step—

The policy advocated by Hinlicky and others is that we threaten to inflict evil in retaliation for evil inflicted on us. If making a particular such threat is justified, what justifies it? Please note: *this* is the question, and not some abstract moralistic question about degrees of moral evil. Of course, working out the question of justification will indeed involve weighing evils, at several junctures. We must weigh the reasonably predictable consequences of the two policies—making the threat or

To stop deterring only compounds existing sins.

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not making it. If both are evils, these are natural evils, disasters. The moral good, all else being equal, would then be the act intending the lesser of these evils. But if it should be that this act is in itself a moral evil—as all hands agree threat-making is—then again we have a weighing of evils, now of moral evils.

What then is the evil to be averted by communicidal threatening? The argument is always the same: If we foreswear communicidal retaliation and the weapons that enable it, may not our state fall? May it not further come to pass that the Soviets dominate the world? Or may it not even work out that in a conventional war, provoked—as we will always see it—by our adversary, we appear to be prevailing and the adversary obliterates us to prevent this, without our being able to take revenge? There is only one reasonable answer to these questions, and at least Christians should be free enough to make it: We do not know. Perhaps. *So what?* So obviously something; but what exactly?

With or without our efforts to the contrary, the American empire will, sooner or later and if the End delays so long, join Babylon and Samarkand in the dust of historical memory. And if God's wrath is so great that it is replaced by an enlarged Soviet empire, neither will that last forever. If anything at all is certain, these things are certain. And therefore the preservation of our state and the containment of the Soviet state, *while they can and do justify very much,* cannot justify all. They cannot justify that last extremity which communicidal weapons propose. They cannot justify ever "pushing the button," completing humankind's destruction after ours is certain. That is, they cannot justify the scenario that the policy of deterrence affirms; they cannot justify the particular threat in the making of which the proposed policy consists.

Deterrence is indeed in itself an immoral act. And the situation is indeed new: nothing whatsoever could justify it.

Part IIIA: Second Rebuttal
By Paul R. Hinlicky

No Alternative to Deterrence

Robert Jenson's argument against deterrence leads to absurd consequences. To stop deterring entails, in all probability, the jeopardizing of a government's obligation to defend its people; for a certainty, it entails abandoning weaker neighbors and indulging an adversary's concupiscence. It is absurd to commend such a loveless and hopeless act. That is so both for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Jenson's recommendation, moreover, misses the mark of true repentance. Even if the U.S. is the "imperial" state he thinks (or, similarly, the U.S.S.R.), to stop deterring only compounds existing sins with heroic disbelief in the preserving and redeeming mercies of God.

1. Jenson knows very well that I hold



nuclear deterrence to be a mortifying experience of divine judgment, yet he indulges in the "blessing of Providence" caricature. So be it. I conceive God's judgment in nuclear deterrence to be the common fate of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Yet he is willing to depict the U.S.S.R. as God's avenger against U.S. imperialism. Let the reader decide.

2. From my description and moral evaluation of nuclear deterrence as a military relation *necessary* for peace, Jenson infers that forthwith I consider it a *sufficient* condition for peace. He calls this hybrid of his own making my "equivocation." Yet it is his own use of the term "policy" which is muddled. He fuses military strategies to maintain deterrence with foreign policy objectives.

3. Hence, his bizarre interpretation of me. If I made any foreign policy proposal, it was to endorse arms control negotiations as that aspect of a comprehensive political work for peace which, as opposed to competition, will best manage deterrence. To imagine that, my "equivocation" exposed, I am revealed as an advocate of Fortress America (i.e., "pure second-strike deterrence," abandoning Western Europe and Japan), is a vanity. To call for stabilizing deterrence means precisely that the military design of deterrence itself should become increasingly the product of negotiations.

4. At several points, Jenson attributes to me the very argument I have repudiated as demagogic; still, he must concede that I do "far better than my fellows (whom, pray tell?)" for seeing that nuclear deterrence must morally be willed as the evil lesser than the intent to aggress. Would he had taken this excellent insight more seriously!

5. But he abandons it at the crucial point with his own piece of "smuggling." Denying the moral intent of nuclear deterrence to avoid war, he speaks of "sincere" rather than *credible* threats. The ghosts of Dulles and Stalin provide Jenson with *his* description of nuclear deterrence, notwithstanding the facts that a) this primitive scenario of pushing the retaliatory button is called precisely the *failure* of deterrence; b) the destruction of the other half *is already* physically ("nuclear winter"), morally, and spiritually ours as well; c) possession of a *credible* retaliatory threat does not logically entail an obligation "sincerely" to carry it out.

6. I am charged with attributing "to ourselves a reliable capacity to distinguish innocence from concupiscence in our own will." Smuggling again! I know of no "innocent will"; we are speaking of civil righteousness; such capacity is attributed to the first use of the law; our obedience is indeed a struggling one.

Jenson would have done better to contest my description of nuclear deterrence. A description is only a judgment of political reason, not of faith. I hold the "threats" not to be boisterous rhetoric, but specific deployment deci-

This argument is a textbook case of a kind of "Lutheranism" that ... has had rather more than its day.

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sions (e.g., the MX versus the Minuteman). So understood, the "threats" are necessary, yet subject to the "middle axiom" of stabilizing deterrence.

The case stands. We will indeed morally choose to remain with nuclear *deterrence* (and define it as the evil lesser than aggression), or nuclear *weapons* will possess us to no good end at all.

Part IIIB: Second Rebuttal By Robert W. Jenson

The Evil of Deterrence

With Paul Hinlicky's corrections available, I see that I have erred in attributing to him a more defensible position than he in fact wishes to advance. Hinlicky thinks that truly "political" thought must begin with present policy. And—I now see—he thinks that therefore he must mean by "deterrence," now blessedly in place and to be defended, the uttering of threats to retaliate communicidally against *any* aggression, "conventional" or otherwise, if attempts to retaliate non-communicidally are failing. If indeed we are to compare *moral* evil, (that is, here, threatening with threatening), it would seem I could rest my case. What would be the threatening as hard or harder to justify than this?

My colleague's argument, if we now can perceive it, is as follows. Nuclear war is known to be unwinnable. Any war must be expected to become nuclear, so long as all potential combatants persevere in threatening nuclear retaliation. Therefore the existence of nuclear weapons should be accepted as God's providence to make general peace by making war useless—if only we do not "apolitically" "undermine" his arrangements by desisting from the acknowledged sin of communicidal threatening or looking for technical means to make war without resort to communicidal weapons. I have to say that this argument is a textbook case of a kind of "Lutheranism" that in my judgment has had rather more than its day. But before getting to that main point, two particular matters.

First, the equivocation I located at the heart of Hinlicky's argument is there also as it is now understood. It is the basis of Hinlicky's position that communicidal weapons cannot be uninvented, so that we simply *are* in a new situation. But then the blessings supposed to inhere in this *fact* are used to justify a *policy* that quite evidently is not a necessary part of it.

Second, there is the matter of John Foster Dulles' demise. Perhaps I should not respond, since if Hinlicky were right about present policy, it would undermine his own argument. However: since Dulles' departure, other policies have of course been added to his, which does not mean his have been subtracted. Current NATO doctrine calls for use of "battlefield" nuclear explosives in any conceivable war fought on the North Ger-



man plain. But this is indeed part of the war-fighting doctrine for "conventional" combat, and has nothing to do with the "deterrence" we are here discussing. That remains in place as Dulles proclaimed it, as the threat to strike targets in Russian population centers if the "conventional" battle goes against us. Nor should my colleague disparage "rhetoric," since deterrence consists in it.

So to the main point. I presume that the latter parts of my second essay will greatly have provoked my colleague. I presume that my position will have been denounced as unrealistic or "apolitical" or to that effect. If I am wrong in these presumptions I have again misjudged him. For I judge that the disagreement between us, as it emerges, goes to the basis of Christian ethics.

Do Christian ethics derive "completely from the proclamation that a human being is justified by faith alone"? I think not. Faith derives completely from this proclamation. But, as Luther insisted, the ethical content of faith is "desire and love for all the *commands* (my emphasis) of God." There is a strain of Lutheranism which has never come to terms with this content-filled character of Luther's—and any possible functioning—ethic, and proposes indeed to derive all ethics from the mere doctrine of justification. The results have been baleful. This strain of Lutheranism tends to think that there is never anything to do about being sinners but to acknowledge that we are such. And it is thus left with no norm of Christian life but God's justification itself; this tempts it to think that as the justifying God makes good from evil, so are we to try to do. Paul Hinlicky is, I fear, greatly tempted by both errors.

As to the first error: the preaching of the law, whether in its "theological" or "political" "uses," is *not* the inculcation of the—true—doctrine that we cannot fulfill the law, but is rather the straightforward proclamation of "all the commands of God." That our hearing of God's commands leaves us more sinners than ever, is an experience with the commands which hearers must be left to make for ourselves. Moreover, the doctrine does *not at all* apply to the law's "political" use, which comprises precisely the reformations the law may produce even as it simultaneously uncovers the "theological" limits of reform. It is failure to observe these points that blinds so many Lutherans to an obvious piece of plain Christianity: with regard to any *particular* course of sin, the message of the church must include the summons to *stop*. Lutherans are regularly accused of moral quietism; that the accusers are often enmeshed in yet worse error does not cancel the frequent accuracy of the charge.

As to the second error: if anything is Pelagian, it is the confusion of ourselves with God, of ethics with miraculous grace, that appears in such "Lutheran" counsels as that with which my colleague concludes his first essay: that we persist in deterrence lest we impede the plans of

God's mysterious uses of evil for good cannot ever be made an ethical norm.

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the God who "truly kills in order to make alive," who entangles us in the sin of deterrence in order to bring therefrom the blessings of peace. God's mysterious uses of evil for good cannot ever be made an ethical norm. If God indeed intends to make the fact of communicidal weapons and even the sin of communicidal threatenings the means of a new possibility of peace-making, that is *his* work. It cannot ever be ours. Our work is to believe that his works are good, and repent of our own evil when we perceive it.

Let me now draw the facit, for our particular subject, of the last three paragraphs. It is precisely *political*—indeed, *the* political—wisdom, that where there is no vision the people perish. Politics is no doubt the art of the possible; and just therefore a necessary contribution to any living polity's process is the proclamation of new possibilities. Where the church or Christians are political participants, it is precisely our political responsibility to state those possibilities that obtain because Jesus is risen and rules and that might not obtain otherwise. What is the same: we are to interpret the present possibilities of any polity by the vision of the Kingdom, of the polity in which "all the commands of God" are indeed loved. Nor is our proclamation permitted to anticipate the doleful problems which will usually be discovered in our vision by other participants, who do not know that Jesus lives or that the Kingdom is on its way.

That we proclaim the certain Triumph of life, freedom, and even happiness also *after* America's possible defeat, and so show that the value inherent in America's defense is not absolute, that there are acts it cannot justify, is the necessary *political* act. It is a word that liberates for rational discussion of what we can and cannot do to defend ourselves; and in a world that contains absolute weapons, it is the *only* word that can do that. What in Lutheran circles undoes political rationality is wheels-within-wheels profundity, of the sort that can even extend to the absurdity of justifying our threats to do mass murder by the fact of sinfulness and by God's miraculous way with it.



Johannes Bugenhagen: A Retrospect on His 500th Birthday

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1983 was Martin Luther's year. 1985 is the year of the musicians. Much attention has been focused on J.S. Bach, G.F. Handel and, to a lesser degree, Heinrich Schuetz. That attention is both justified and efficacious, for it celebrates the accomplishments of great artists while at the same time enhancing the cultural sensitivities of twentieth-century society.

1985 also marks the five hundredth birthday of Johannes Bugenhagen (died 1558), one of the closest associates of Martin Luther and a leading evangelical reformer of the sixteenth century. Interest in Bugenhagen, however, has been quite limited and has been evident primarily in the German Democratic Republic. Yet the Pomeranian reformer was one of the chief architects of the Lutheran Reformation, especially in northern Germany and in parts of Scandinavia. His theological and practical impact was formidable and formative, and he was respected by his friends and criticized by his foes because of his crucial, pragmatic contributions to the Reformation. After 1520, when he joined Luther's reform movement, the goal of his diverse activity was to explicate the evangelical faith and to foster the Lutheran Reformation which, in his opinion, had recovered the essence and purity of the Christian tradition.

The following retrospect is intended to illustrate the diversity and significance of Bugenhagen's reformatory work and to present him as a full-fledged reformer of the church. For methodological reasons and for the sake of clarity it is useful to examine Bugenhagen's work according to a number of specific categories. These categories are not intended to reflect successive stages of Bugenhagen's lifework, however. Rather, they describe coordinate and interrelated aspects of the reformer's career.

Educator

Johannes Bugenhagen was a man of substance and of ability. That fact was recognized by Philip Melanchthon shortly after Bugenhagen arrived in Wittenberg in the Spring of 1521.[1] It was Melanchthon who encourged Bugenhagen to resume the vocation which he had pursued since the age of nineteen and which was to remain a major focus of his labors until the last years of his life, namely, that of educator and teacher. It may well be argued that Bugenhagen was always a teacher at heart, whether he lectured in the classroom, published his commentaries and treatises, stood in the pulpit, produced his church orders, or wrote his extensive correspondence. His desire to explicate the faith and to educate people clearly permeated and shaped his life's work.

Bugenhagen began his lengthy teaching career in 1504 when he was appointed rector of the Latin school in the Pomeranian city of Treptow. The school flourished under his guidance and attracted students from as far away as

His role as the architect of a diverse educational system.

Westphalia. Humanistic studies, catechetical instruction, and biblical lectures constituted the heart of the curriculum. Bugenhagen's concern was not only to train potential scholars but also to acquaint his students in the Word of God and to foster their faith and piety. Humanist ideals,[2] a profound love and respect for the Scriptures, and a growing concern for ethical reform and renewal among both laity and clergy inspired and motivated Bugenhagen's work. His academic responsibilities diversified in 1517 when he was appointed lecturer in the monastic school of the nearby monastery of Belbug. Of course, he attempted to awaken similar concerns and to inculcate similar ideals among the monks, and it appears that his impact was substantial. When he joined the Reformation a number of his students as well as the abbot of the Belbug monastery, Johann Boldewan, followed him to Wittenberg.

Bugenhagen's teaching career was interrupted only briefly when he left Pomerania and traveled to Saxony. Because of the lofty reputation he had already attained through his work in Treptow, Pomeranian students studying in Wittenberg quickly gathered around him, and he lectured to them privately on the Psalms.[3] It was through these lectures that Bugenhagen came to the attention of Melanchthon who encouraged him to lecture publicly. Bugenhagen agreed to do so and continued to teach at the University even though he did not become an official member of the theological faculty until 1533. He was, therefore, associated with the University of Wittenberg from 1521 until his death and lectured there regularly whenever he was not traveling. The University and its educational program were always of primary interest to Bugenhagen because he recognized the significance of education for the welfare of both church and society.[4]

Bugenhagen's educational activities and contributions reach far beyond the classroom, however. He excelled as a catechetical preacher,[5] and his publications also have an obvious didactic character. The biblical commentaries were essentially published versions of his theological lectures, and many of his other works, such as his *Von dem Christenloven* (Concerning the Christian Faith)[6] are clear expositions of central evangelical teachings. It was, however, in his role as the architect of a diverse educational system that Bugenhagen made his most extensive and significant educational contributions. That system was constructed in the eight church orders which he authored or co-authored for each of the cities and territories in which he worked.[7] His proposals in the church orders were detailed and precise, for they were intended to provide the evangelical territories with thorough guidelines and practical institutional suggestions.[8]

Bugenhagen's educational system included vernacular boys' and girls'



schools, the *lectorium,*[9] and the university, but its main institution was the Latin school, a precursor of the German *Gymnasium.* Because of his practical concerns, Bugenhagen explicated the curriculum, the various class divisions, the educational goals, the staffing needs, and the administrative structure of the Latin school with great precision. The educational purposes and programs of the other schools were also discussed, but not in such detail. Because he was concerned about the whole educational spectrum, Bugenhagen also advocated the establishment of libraries, promoted a regular schedule of student evaluations, provided for the physical, economic and spiritual welfare of both students and faculty, and made suggestions concerning appropriate learning materials. By formulating a hierarchy of educational institutions which offered opportunities for primary, secondary, and higher education and by articulating precise institutional, curricular, and methodological guidelines Bugenhagen hoped to address the pressing educational needs of the evangelical churches and territories and to provide them with an educational system that was readily implementable. While opposition to his ideas manifested itself even in his native Pomerania,[10] the educational reforms carried out in the Catharineum and Martineum in Braunschweig, the Johanneum and the academic *Gymnasium* in Hamburg, the Catharineum in Lübeck and the University of Copenhagen indicate that his proposals were also taken seriously. It is evident, then, that Bugenhagen's educational ideas and ideals were not only proposed but also implemented.

In evaluating the total spectrum of Bugenhagen's educational contributions, the following comments may be made. While he focused his attention on secondary and university education and incorporated various humanist ideals, Bugenhagen was not an educational elitist. He was also one of the most diligent proponents of primary education during the sixteenth century. As such he was a leading advocate of vernacular schools and of the education of girls.[11] Furthermore, Bugenhagen recognized and affirmed the significance of education for the welfare of the church. He pointed out that future pastors and leaders were trained in the schools, but also that Christian nurture and catechetical instruction took place there, that boys and girls were prepared to be capable Christian parents and that the children were taught their worship responsibilities.[12] While the school remained integrally related to the church in Bugenhagen's thought, he assigned primary responsibility for the establishment, support, and supervision of education to the secular authorities,[13] thereby anticipating future developments toward universal, public education.

It must be admitted that Bugenhagen was not a highly innovative thinker, and

The organizational genius of the Lutheran Reformation.


was influenced by the educational ideals of Luther and Melanchthon.[14] Of course, to be an innovator was not his goal. He was much more concerned to be a practical architect of an educational system which would be effective and could be readily implemented. He often adopted existing institutions, theories, and methodologies and initiated changes only when there were theological or pedagogical reasons for doing so.[15] Because of his varied academic pursuits and accomplishments Bugenhagen deserves to be numbered among the leading educators of the sixteenth century and must be recognized as a persistent proponent of education and as a careful educational strategist within the evangelical context.

Organizer

Bugenhagen's practical nature, so evident in his educational work, was precisely the characteristic which enabled him to make his most unique contributions to the Reformation movement. Scholars generally describe the Pomeranian reformer as the organizational genius of the Lutheran Reformation.[16] Bugenhagen played a central role in the gradual transformation of Lutheranism into an independent ecclesiastical community, and his work as organizer was of crucial significance for the longevity of the Lutheran movement. He must also be given much credit for the growth of that movement during the first half of the sixteenth century.

Bugenhagen's reputation as the organizer of the Lutheran Reformation rests largely on the work he accomplished during his extensive organizational travels and on his careful delineation of organizational structures for the emerging Lutheran churches in his eight church orders. Between 1528 and 1542 Bugenhagen traveled throughout northern Germany and in Denmark with the specific purpose of bringing stability and organizational direction to the Lutheran communities in these regions. It was also during this same time period and in conjunction with these travels that Bugenhagen produced his church orders. The account of this major chapter in Bugenhagen's life is a fascinating story which reveals a person of faithfulness to the Reformation cause, of persistence and yet of patience, of perception, of humor, of confidence and of virtually boundless energy and dedication.

Although Bugenhagen had received invitations from the St. Nicholas congregation of Hamburg in 1524 and from the city council of Danzig (Gdansk) in 1525, external and internal circumstances prevented him from accepting these calls.[17] However, in 1528 he embarked on the most illustrious and public phase of his career. By this time he had clearly emerged as a prominent leader of the Reformation and a member of the Wittenberg inner circle. His name appeared on most of the important *Gutachten* (opinions) issued by the Wit-



tenberg theologians. He had become a well-known published author, and his fame was beginning to spread.[18] Furthermore, his ability to speak and write Low German made him the ideal candidate for the task which stood before him. Thus it was that he visited and fostered the Reformation in Braunschweig (May-September, 1528), Hamburg (October, 1528-June, 1529), Lübeck (October, 1530-April, 1532), Pomerania (December, 1534-August, 1535), Denmark (July, 1537-June, 1539), Schleswig-Holstein (February-May, 1542), Hildesheim (September-October, 1542) and Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel (October, 1542).

Wherever he went he addressed the conflicts between the Lutherans and the defenders of the established church, preached regularly, visited the churches and acquainted himself with their needs, resolved theological debates, reformed the liturgy, revitalized education, fostered the care of the poor, and produced church orders which provided authoritative guidance in a specific city or territory.[19] Bugenhagen therefore answered crucial theological and organizational questions, resolved conflicts, organized institutions, and established formative guidelines during his travels. Through this careful organizational work he gave clear direction to the evangelical churches, provided the bases for growth and maturation and constructed the institutional framework which was absolutely necessary in contexts where existing institutions had either been rejected or were non-functioning.

In the European context the Lutheran Reformation and the Lutheran Church enjoyed their greatest success and longevity in the areas where Bugenhagen's impact was most direct, namely, in northern Germany and Scandinavia. Of course, Bugenhagen's activity does not fully explain this reality. Certainly ecclesiastical problems, political support, capable local leadership, and powerful popular sentiments, especially in the cities, were other important contributing forces. Nevertheless, Bugenhagen's skillful organizational labors on behalf of the Reformation must be recognized as an essential factor in the growth and maturation of northern European, especially northern German, Lutheranism.

The importance and effectiveness of Bugenhagen's organizational work was affirmed by his contemporaries. After he had completed his work, the people of Braunschweig wanted Bugenhagen to become their first superintendent and remain in their midst for another year. The citizens of Hamburg also sought to retain his services, but when Bugenhagen decided to return to Wittenberg they, nevertheless, demonstrated their appreciation by presenting him with a parting gift of one hundred gulden for himself and twenty gulden for his wife Walpurga.[20] Daniel Cramer, an important seventeenth-century Pomeranian

Viewed as a model for the pastoral and ... the episcopal office.

chronicler, affirmed the significance of Bugenhagen's work in his native Pomerania. Commenting on the church visitation which the reformer had led in 1535, he wrote:

> This was then in the whole country the extensive, salutary and first visitation which Dr. Bugenhagen helped accomplish in this country. Therefore this praiseworthy Doctor should rightly be called the other Pomeranian apostle ..., (for) he has cleansed ... this land of the papal leaven. Thereby he has served his fatherland to eternal honor; for which God be praised eternally.[21]

Finally, the urgent requests by King Christian III of Denmark that Bugenhagen become Bishop of Schleswig in 1541 and head of the University of Copenhagen in 1542 are not only indications of the close friendship which developed between the king and the reformer but also a clear sign of the confidence and respect which Bugenhagen enjoyed.[22]

Pastor

Although Bugenhagen responded to pleas for assistance from other evangelical communities, he always returned to Wittenberg and refused all offers to leave this small, yet crucial, center of the Lutheran movement. Certainly Luther's presence there is one explanation for Bugenhagen's loyalty to Wittenberg. The fact that he was the called pastor of the city church is another, and, as we shall see, these two factors are integrally related. Bugenhagen accomplished much as pastor of Wittenberg, and this role must be cited as still another significant aspect of his diverse career. Indeed, Ernst Wolf has argued that his whole reformatory work should be viewed in the light of his "episcopal" consciousness which was shaped by New Testament ideals.[23]

Bugenhagen was already a priest when he arrived in Wittenberg. He had been ordained in 1508 or 1509 and had served as vicar of the church of St. Mary in Treptow, even as he continued his rectorship in the city school.[24] However, we know virtually nothing about his pastoral activities during these early years. It was while he carried out his responsibilities in Wittenberg that he came to be viewed as a model for the pastoral and even the episcopal office within the evangelical context. Luther himself fostered this perception.

Bugenhagen was elected pastor of the city church by the congregation and the city council in 1523. The manner of his election set a precedent which was often followed by Lutheran congregations when bishops refused to select Lutheran pastors. Luther himself supported Bugenhagen's election, but the latter hesitated to accept because of his Low German dialect. He finally responded positively, however, partly for the



pragmatic reason that he had recently married and needed a regular means of support. Once he assumed his duties he did so with vigor and dedication, and he remained Wittenberg's pastor until the end of his life.

He immediately instituted a regular schedule of preaching and ascended the pulpit himself at least three times a week, on Sunday morning, on Wednesday and on Saturday. He worked diligently to reopen the city school which had been closed during the tumultuous days of Andreas Karlstadt and the Zwickau prophets. The care of the poor was another immediate concern, and a poor chest was organized by 1527 under Bugenhagen's supervision. In addition to his regular responsibilities as city pastor, he also continued to lecture at the University, helped prepare for various Diets and theological discussions, and either planned or participated in a number of visitations of the churches in Saxony. Throughout the 1520's he also defended the Protestant right of resistance in the face of imperial threats,[25] taking this position initially in opposition to Luther.

When the University of Wittenberg was reorganized during the early 1530's the city pastor was assigned specific teaching responsibilities. Bugenhagen had, of course, already been teaching at the University, but this stipulation now made a regular schedule of lectures part of his pastoral responsibilities. Those responsibilities were extended even further when he was chosen to be the General Superintendent of Saxony, a position which essentially made him the administrative and spiritual head of the church in that region. He was symbolically, if not in fact, primate of German Lutheranism and a model for other evangelical ecclesiastical leaders.

Bugenhagen's own understanding of the pastoral office is reflected in his church orders. Preaching constitutes the heart of the pastor's task, according to Bugenhagen, for the Gospel prospers thereby. The content of evangelical preaching must, therefore, be the "pure Word of God," i.e., "Christ crucified."[26] Bugenhagen warned that all preachers who replace the Gospel with human teachings must be avoided, and he urged that the people of God pray to the Lord of the harvest for faithful pastors. Such pastors are truly a "noble gift of God."[27] Since preaching is so central to the pastoral task in Bugenhagen's thinking, he gave precise and detailed instructions concerning the extensive preaching responsibilities of evangelical pastors.[28] In addition to preaching, the celebration of the sacraments is also crucial for as word and sign the sacraments are the very same Gospel which is proclaimed in the preached word.[29] Disciplinary responsibilities, the visitation of the sick, teaching, and concern for the care of the poor are further aspects of the pastor's calling.

Because he believed that pastors deserve "double honor" (1 Tim. 5:17)

Bugenhagen was ... Luther's pastor.

and should be paid amply for their labors (1 Cor. 9:14), Bugenhagen consistently urged congregations to provide their pastors with an adequate salary and with comfortable housing. He was particularly concerned about these matters because evangelical pastors could marry and were, therefore, responsible for their families. Certainly Christians should be able to support pastors in the honorable estate of marriage, argues Bugenhagen, since they cared quite well for so many celibate priests in the past. Inadequate support will force pastors to remain unmarried just as surely as the church's regulations did before the time of the Reformation. Pastors who become ill or who retire must also be cared for, as well as the widows and orphans of these servants of the Word. Thankfulness for God's gracious gift of the Gospel should be sufficient motivation for providing adequate support to pastors and their families.[30] With such advice Bugenhagen sought to remind congregations of their responsibilities and to assure the physical welfare of the evangelical clergy.

As pastor of the city church of Wittenberg Bugenhagen was also Luther's pastor. This fact is significant not only for the positive relationship which developed between these two men but also for the Reformation movement in general. Because of his intense personality and his profound spiritual struggles, Martin Luther needed and benefited from the personal and pastoral support of his two most important spiritual counselors, Johannes von Staupitz and, after 1523, Johannes Bugenhagen. The latter's council assisted Luther during his persistent *Anfechtungen* and provided him with strength during a number of physical crises in the last decades of his life.

Luther appreciated the ministry of his friend and pastor. Even though he chided Bugenhagen for his lengthy sermons,[31] he also praised him as an excellent teacher in the pulpit who gave his hearers much to think about.[32] While Bugenhagen's public ministry was important to Luther, he was even more grateful for his pastor's personal ministry. When Bugenhagen spoke words of comfort to him in times of spiritual or physical trials, it seemed to Luther as though he was listening to the voice of an angel since his heart was touched so profoundly.[33] Perhaps Bugenhagen was such an effective counselor because he perceived himself to be an instrument of God as he brought assurance to his friend. He could, therefore, encourage Luther: "Dear Doctor, what I am telling you you should accept not as my word but as God's word which He declares through me."[34] It is not surprising that Luther eagerly longed for Bugenhagen's return from his organizational travels, especially when his absence was a prolonged one.[35] Luther turned to Bugenhagen in March, 1537 when he became critically ill and believed that he would die. Bugenhagen



not only recorded Luther's last will and testament at that crucial moment, but he also served once again as Luther's pastor. It was to Bugenhagen that Luther commended the church, the University of Wittenberg, and his beloved Katherine, and it was Bugenhagen whom he asked to absolve his sins.[36] Of course, Luther recovered in 1537 and lived for nine more years. When he died in 1546, Bugenhagen preached one of the funeral sermons in which he praised Luther as the angel with the eternal gospel (Revelation 14:6) and as the swan whose coming John Hus had supposedly prophesied.[37]

Social Reformer

Bugenhagen emerges as an important voice for social reform in the sixteenth-century context. One of the most persistent challenges faced by church and society during the century of the Reformation was the care of the poor. Poverty was rampant in urban as well as in rural contexts, and beggars were an ever-present reality. Although city governments attempted to address this problem by the late Middle Ages, the care of the poor was essentially the responsibility of the church and almsgiving was the basic means employed to help the poor. Bugenhagen realized that the evangelical movement would also have to address this issue. He, therefore, incorporated a section on poor relief in his church orders. As was the case with his educational program, Bugenhagen's goal was to provide the evangelical cities and territories with a pragmatic plan that could be readily implemented. He, therefore, promoted the care of the poor as a responsibility of the family and of the local community; articulated guidelines for identifying the "worthy poor";[38] described the structure, administration, and supervision of the poor chest, which was to be the institution through which poor relief resources were collected and distributed; and clarified the specific duties of the deacons, who were to function as the poor relief personnel.[39]

It is apparent that in certain respects Bugenhagen's poor relief system marks a significant advancement in comparison to the medieval context. Bugenhagen recognized, for example, that the care of the poor and poverty itself must be reinterpreted on the basis of new theological and social perspectives. Poverty was no longer seen as an ideal expression of the Christian life but rather as a social, economic, or personal problem which had to be overcome. Although love for the neighbor and the service of God were obviously not new concepts, they were now promoted as the sole impetuses for the care of the poor since the good works piety of the medieval church was rejected by the evangelical reformers.[40] Bugenhagen also recognized that the decentralized, voluntary almsgiving of the Middle Ages had to be reformed both for theological and practical reasons. He maintained,

Bugenhagen was a pivotal figure in the growth and maturation of the Lutheran movement.

therefore, that caring for the poor was not a matter of free choice but a responsibility of the individual Christian and of the Christian community,[41] and he proposed the organized, centralized, and regulated system of the poor chest as a corrective for the decentralized practice of begging and almsgiving. Indeed, begging was repeatedly forbidden in the church orders.[42]

While it was still located and administered within the church, the poor chest was no longer solely a spiritual or ecclesiastical institution. The deacons who collected and distributed the resources of the chest were all laypeople and representatives both of the congregation and of the government. The pastor supported and supervised the work of the deacons but was not a member of the poor relief personnel. They gave an annual account of their activities before the city council, and the council was expected to support the community's poor relief efforts with periodic contributions.[43] While the cooperation of ecclesiastical and secular authorities in caring for the poor had already begun during the late Middle Ages, especially in the cities, Bugenhagen's system fostered this cooperation and placed poor relief into the hands of the whole society, not only the church.

Theologian

What is Bugenhagen's theological significance? Only Hans-Hermann Holfelder has made substantial contributions within this context.[44] Bugenhagen was a respected and frequently published author during the sixteenth century.[45] With a few exceptions, however, Bugenhagen's works are available only in their original editions. A modern critical edition of many of these works is presently being planned in Germany, but it is not yet in print.[46] The theological writings of the Pomeranian reformer range from published lectures to the church orders. They include commentaries on Old Testament and New Testament books; various treatises, especially on the eucharist; letters; *Gutachten* (theological opinions); and sermons. Bugenhagen's stature among the sixteenth-century reformers, the breadth and volume of his publications and the respect he received, especially from Luther,[47] all suggest that he was a theologian of substance and significance. The validity of this suggestion must, of course, be tested by future scholarship.

It is clear, however, that Johannes Bugenhagen Pomeranus should be recognized not only as the organizer of the Lutheran Reformation but as a reformer of both church and society. His contributions as organizer, educator, pastor, social reformer, theologian, close friend and spiritual advisor of Luther, and respected ecclesiastical leader were multifaceted and formative. Bugenhagen was a pivotal figure in the growth and maturation of the Lutheran movement and in its emergence as a



distinct ecclesiastical community. His place in the triumvirate of the great Lutheran reformers is assured, and he deserves the attention of twentieth-century students of the Reformation and its heritage.

End Notes

[1]The exact date of Bugenhagen's arrival in Wittenberg cannot be ascertained. It does appear, however, that he enrolled in the University of Wittenberg on April 29, 1521. Cf. Hellmuth Heyden, *Kirchengeschichte Pommerns,* I (2nd ed; Köln-Braunsfeld: Rudolf Müller, 1957), 201. Even if Bugenhagen arrived as early as March, 1521, there is no evidence that he met Luther before the latter's departure for Worms on April 2, 1521. After Luther returned from the Wartburg, he, too, became an ardent advocate of Bugenhagen and eagerly sought to keep him in Wittenberg. Cf. *D. Martin Luthers Werke. Briefwechsel* (Weimar, 1930-1948), 2:598. Hereafter referred to as WA Br. WA Br 2:605; WA Br 2:613.

[2]It cannot be determined with certainty whether Bugenhagen studied with the well-known humanist Hermann von dem Busche at Greifswald. It is apparent, however, that Bugenhagen was introduced to humanist ideas at the University and that humanist concerns attracted him throughout the first two decades of the sixteenth century. Thus his relationship to humanism mirrors that of Luther. Neither man should be called a humanist though both were influenced by humanist ideals.

[3]The Book of Psalms was one of Bugenhagen's favorite portions of Scripture, and he published a popular commentary on the Psalms. Cf. IOANNIS/POMERA-/NI BVGENHAGII IN LI/BRVM PSALMORVM/ INTERPRETATIO,/WITTEMBERGAE/publice lecta./BASILEAE/ANNO M.D.XXIIII. MENSE MARTIO./

[4]Reinhold Vormbaum, ed., *Die evangelischen Schulordnungen des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1860), p. 34.

[5]Cf. Georg Buchwald, ed., *Johann Bugenhagens Katechismus-predigten gehalten 1525 bis 1532,* Quellen und Darstellungen aus der Geschichte des Reformationsjahrhunderts, Vol. IX (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1909).

[6]A printed version of this work can be found in Karl August Traugott Vogt. *Johannes Bugenhagen Pomeranus* (Elberfeld: R.L. Friderichs, 1867), pp. 101-267. Hereafter referred to as K.A.T. Vogt.

[7]Bugenhagen's church orders are those of Braunschweig (1528), Hamburg (1529), Lübeck (1531), Pomerania (1535), Denmark (1537), Schleswig-Holstein (1542), Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel (1543) and Hildesheim (1544). The church orders were basically ecclesiastical constitutions which consisted of three chief sections, one dealing with liturgical matters, the other with the care of the poor and the third with education. Because the church orders were given legal status they functioned as powerful reminders of the ideals promoted by Bugenhagen. With the exception of the Danish and the Schleswig-Holstein church orders, critical editions of Bugenhagen's orders have been printed in Emil Sehling, ed., *Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts,* 15 vols. (Leipzig: O.R. Reisland; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1902-). Hereafter referred to as Sehling.

[8]Cf. the Braunschweig church order in Sehling VI,I, 337-445. Although local concerns and differences were addressed in the specific church orders, Bugenhagen's first order, that for the city of Braunschweig, was a model and norm for all the others.

[9]The *lectorium* was an embryonic university which Bugenhagen proposed particularly for the cities of Hamburg and Lübeck. Lectures in theology, law and medicine (Hamburg, Sehling V, 499) or simply in theology (Lübeck, Sehling V, 340) were offered in the *lectorium* which served well-educated local residents who were unable to attend a university or even university graduates who wished to continue or refresh their studies.

[10]Martin Wehrmann, *Die Begründung des evangelischen Schulwesens in Pommern bis 1563,* Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für deutsche Erziehung und Schulgeschichte, Beihefte VII (Berlin: A. Hofmann & Komp. 1905), p. 20. The city of Stargard opposed Bugenhagen's efforts to establish and revitalize schools. Economic considerations were the primary reason for this opposition.

[11]In contrast to Bugenhagen's concerns, elementary instruction was generally ignored by other leading sixteenth-century educators. While Calvin's academy offered some vernacular instruction in the first years of study, Melanchthon, Johannes Sturm of Strassburg and the Jesuits did not concern themselves with the elementary stages of the educational process. The education of girls was also generally neglected by these individuals or groups. Among the Roman Catholics the Ursulines did, of course, address this latter concern.

[12]Cf. Sehling VI,I, 50-53, 399-405; Sehling V, 347-348, 491, 516, 522-525. The boys who attended Latin school were expected to sing in the choir of the parish church. In addition to hymns and anthems they also sang various parts of the liturgy and provided leadership for congregational participation in the worship of the church.

[13]Cf., for example, Sehling V, 343.

[14]Luther's most important educational treatises were his *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,* cf. *Luther's Works,* ed. by Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 44:115-217, (hereafter referred to as LW); his *To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools,* LW 45:339-378 and his *A Sermon on Keeping Children in School,* LW 46:207-258. The *Instruction of the Visitors to the Pastors of Electoral Saxony* is an important source for the educational ideas of Melanchthon. Cf. Aemilius Ludwig Richter, *Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts,* I (Weimar: Verlag des Landes-Industriecomptoirs, 1846), esp. 99-101. It is clear that the *Instruction* was an important model for Bugenhagen's church orders. Cf. also Kurt K. Hendel, "Johannes Bugenhagen's Educational Contributions" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1974).

[15]For example, his understanding of baptism necessitated the nurturing of the faith in an educational context (cf. Sehling VI,I, 362-364). Pedagogical concerns caused him to advocate the study of Greek and the rudiments of Hebrew in the Latin school, even though Melanchthon argued that only Latin should be taught (cf. Sehling VI,I, 368).

[16]Cf. especially Anneliese Sprengler-Ruppenthal, "Bugenhagen und das protestantische Kirchenrecht," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte,* 88, Kanonist, Abt. LVII (1971), pp. 196-233; Ernst Wolf, "Johannes Bugenhagen, Gemeinde und Amt," in *Peregrinatio* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1954), pp. 257-278 and Ernst Wolf, "Johannes Bugenhagen und die 'Ordnung der Gemeinde,'" in *Festschrift für Karl Kupisch,* ed. by Ernst Wolf with Helmut Gollwitzer and Joachim Hoppe (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963), pp. 281-298; also Hellmuth Heyden, "Bugenhagen als Reformator und *tag,* ed. by Werner Rautenberg (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), pp. 7-23 and Kurd Schulz, "Bugenhagen als Schöpfer der Kirchenordnung," in *Johann Bugenhagen. Beiträge zu seinem 400. Todestag,* ed. by Werner Rautenberg (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), pp. 51-63.

[17]While his Wittenberg congregation gave Bugenhagen a six-month leave in order to heed St. Nicholas' call, the Hamburg city council protested that the call had been issued without its knowledge, that it was against the provisions of the Diet of Nürnberg and that Bugenhagen's marriage made him unacceptable as a pastor in Hamburg. Bugenhagen reprimanded the council for forbidding the preaching of God's Word, but he then reluctantly turned down the call. Cf. Otto Vogt, ed., *Dr. Johannes Bugenhagens Briefwechsel* (Stettin: Leon Sauniers, 1888), pp. 22-23. Hereafter referred to as Vogt, *Briefwechsel.* Bugenhagen did not go to Danzig because the Wittenberg congregation refused to give him a leave in 1525.

[18]When the city council of Danzig sent their letter to Luther in 1525 seeking an evangelical preacher they particularly requested Bugenhagen "about whom the world says and boasts great things." Quoted in Emil Görigk, *Johannes Bugenhagen und die Protestantisierung Pommerns* (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1895), p. 22.

[19]While some of the church orders, such as the Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel order of 1543, did not enjoy much influence or longevity, others, like the Lübeck order of 1531, seem to have had a direct impact on the church's life into the nineteenth century. Cf. Johann Michael Reu, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Katechismus-unterrichts,* Vol. III, 1b: *Ost-, Nord- und Westdeutsche Katechismen,* Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts in der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands zwischen 1530 und 1600, Part I (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1935), 612-613.

[20]Bugenhagen was one of the earliest evangelical pastors to marry when he and Walpurga exchanged vows on October 13,

1522. He later defended clerical marriage in a tract entitled *De conjugio episcoporum et deaconorum* (1525).

[21]Daniel Cramer, *Das Grosse Pomrische Kirchen Chronicon,* 4 Books in 1 Volume (Alt-Stettin: Nicol. Barthelt, 1628), Book III, 92. Cramer considered Bishop Otto of Bamberg (ca. 1060-1139), who made missionary journeys to Pomerania in 1124-1125 and in 1128, to be the first Pomeranian apostle.

[22]Bugenhagen turned down both invitations, partly because he felt that he was too old but probably also because he did not want to leave the aging Luther. Cf. Vogt, *Briefwechsel,* p. 221 and pp. 223-224. In June, 1544 Bugenhagen was also elected bishop of Cammin and thus prelate of Pomerania. While he expressed his reluctance to leave Wittenberg where he was already "bishop," he agreed to accept if he could resign whenever he wished and then appoint his successor. The Dukes of Pomerania did not accept these conditions, and Bugenhagen was relieved. Cf. ibid., p. 308.

[23]Ernst Wolf, "Johannes Bugenhagen, Gemeinde und Amt." Cf. #16 above.

[24]Johannes Bergsma, *Die Reform der Messliturgie durch Johannes Bugenhagen* (Kevelaer: Butzon & Bercker; Hildesheim: Bernward Verlag, 1966), p. 2; also Leonid Arbusow, *Die Einführung der Reformation in Liv-, Est- und Kurland,* Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte, Vol. III (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1921), p. 171.

[25]Heinz Scheible, ed., *Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen Protestanten 1523-1546,* Heft X of *Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte* ed. by Gerhard Ruhbach with the collaboration of Gustav Adolf Benrath, Heinz Scheible and Kurt-Victor Selge (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1969), pp. 27-28. Bugenhagen argued that rulers who disobey God's Word need not be recognized as legitimate magistrates and may be opposed by lower magistrates. Hence the Lutheran princes may resist the Emperor who stood against the Gospel in his opposition to the Lutheran Reformation.

[26]Sehling VI, I, 371.

[27]Ibid., p. 372.

[28]Cf., for example, ibid., pp. 376-383.

[29]Ibid., p. 406.

[30]Ibid., pp. 375-376.

[31]*D. Martin Luthers Werke. Tischreden* (Weimar, 1912-1921), 2:574. Hereafter referred to as WA TR. WA TR 3:60; WA TR 4:592.

[32]WA TR 3:357; WA TR 5:396.

[33]WA TR 1:47-48.

[34]Quoted in K.A.T. Vogt, p. 71.

[35]WA Br 5:67; WA Br 6:231.

[36]WA TR 4:601; cf. also LW 54:374.

[37]Cf. Eine christliche Predigt/vber den Leich vnd begrebnis/des Ehrwirdigen D. Martini Luthers/durch Ern Johan Bugenhagen Pomern/Doctor/vnd Pfarherr der Kirchen zu Wittemberg durch Georgen Rhaw Anno MDXLVI.

[38]The worthy poor, who would be assisted, had to be people of faith who enjoyed a good reputation and manifested high ethical standards. They were registered and then cared for by the deacons. Cf. Sehling V, 360 and Sehling IV, 337.

[39]Cf., for example, Bugenhagen's description of the poor relief system in the Hamburg church order, Sehling V, 532-540. However, he addresses these concerns in all of the church orders.

[40]Sehling IV, 336.

[41]Sehling VI,I, 445. Families with sufficient resources were, however, encouraged to take care of their own poor so that the resources of the poor chest could be used more efficiently. Sehling VI,I, 77 and 447.

[42]Sehling V, 361; Sehling VI,I, 452.

[43]For examples of the role of the city council in the poor relief system see Sehling V, 533, 536 and 539; Sehling IV, 338.

[44]Hans-Hermann Holfelder, *Solus Christus,* Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, Vol. 63 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1981) and, by the same author, *Tentatio et consolatio: Studien zu Bugenhagen's "Interpretatio in Librum Psalmorum,"* Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. 45 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974).

[45]Georg Geisenhof, *Bibliotheca Bugenhagiana,* Quellen and Darstellungen aus der Geschichte des Reformationsjahrhunderts, Vol. VI (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1908).

[46]Wolf-Dieter Hauschild of the University of Münster is the editor of this four-volume edition.

[47]For example, in his preface to Bugenhagen's *Commentary on the Psalms* Luther called Bugenhagen "the first in the world who truly deserves to be called an expositor of the Psalter." Cf. the *In Librvm Psalmorvm Interpretatio* of 1524.

Your Face, Your Cloak, Your Coat, Your Shoes: Parish-Based Community Organization

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"When the Stranger says, "What is the meaning of this city?
Do you huddle together because you love each other?"
What will you answer?
"We all dwell together to make money from each other"?
or "This is a Community"?
(Chorus from "The Rock" by T.S. Eliot)

Filling the "Naked Public Square"

To the list of commemorations of heroes of the church, I would add the name of a radical, feisty Jew: Saul Alinsky. When asked by a group of seminarians for advice for the future, Alinksy said something like this: "You only need to answer one question: Do you want to be bishop? All the other answers will follow." Sometime during my previous career as a part of the sixties generation which was going to change the world by flashing the peace sign and watching ROTC buildings burn I read Alinsky's *Rules For Radicals,* and my world was not quite the same again. Later Alinksy's legacy was to have a direct influence on my life and ministry in the form of the intelligent, tough, and well-trained organizers he left behind. The discipline and sound activism of parish-based community organizing still makes sense to me as a vehicle for real participation of the people of God in the creation of human community. I am more convinced than ever that it provides a means for living the implications of the gospel in today's world.

I have been involved in this form of social ministry for twelve years of my ministry, and have wrestled with the theological issues it raises. I began by flying by the seat of my pants in the Fan district of Richmond, Virginia, going down to the James River to round up the drunks and homeless and bring them to my parish for hot meals prepared by the shut-ins of the church. Out of this and other "capers" evolved coalitions for service and change which exist to this day. It has been my privilege since those scruffy beginnings to associate with some of the finest organizers around, especially those from the Alinsky-founded Industrial Areas Foundation. During these years my ministry and the parishes I have served have been enriched by insights gained in the process.

There is a renewed interest in our time in the critical interplay of the practice of religion and the public arena. The 1984 presidential election revealed a keen interest in the public implications of religious values and beliefs. Bishops O'Connor and Bernardin, Mario Cuomo, Geraldine Ferarro, Jerry Falwell and Ronald Reagan all joined in the debate.

The Roman Catholic bishops have contributed to this "kairos" of opportunity for conversation concerning the public implications of our beliefs and liturgies with their pastorals on peace and economics.

Significant books are signalling the renewed engagement of Christians in the public arena of power and decisions. Harvey Cox looks again at the Secular City and notes the increasing political content of religious activity. His gaze ranges from base religious communities in Latin America to the powerful political muscle and agenda of the "new religious right" in America. He sees within these poles a nascent "postmodern theology" in which the hopes of religious longing return to the secular city. He asks, "Where will the resources for a postmodern theology come from?" He sees clues for an answer coming from the edges, from those not previously empowered in communal life. Community organization can be one instrument for bringing those on the edges into the center, a way of doing "postmodern" theology.

Richard Neuhaus writes about the "Naked Public Square," the square being bereft as the "result of political doctrine and practice which would exclude religion and religously grounded values from the conduct of public business."[1] The author argues that the values and beliefs of our Christian traditions have always been a part of the shaping of America and must be returned to the "naked public square." He writes, "Christian truth, if it is true, is public truth. It is accessible to public reason. It impinges upon public space. At some critical points of morality and ethics it speaks to public policy."[2]

How does Christian truth speak to public policy? How do Christian values inhabit the naked public square? We have seen Falwell's way. Is there an alternative to "moral majority" attempts to "Christianize" the public square? Can the mass of turned-off America be engaged in the negotiations and compromises which create their world, participating with power and skill as they speak from their values? I believe there is one biblical mandate as old as creation. Humans were created to "fill the earth and conquer it." To be subjects, not objects of their world was part of the created dignity of being human and honoring the Creator. Can community organization which seriously attempts to involve the people be a form of worship?

The people of God do not often participate in the naked public square in meaningful ways. Their denomination lobbies and advocates on certain issues, often without their input. Their judicatories pass statements and resolutions in their name. These efforts are often made without any serious intention to develop in the people the kind of power and analysis which will make these convictions effective and real in the political life. As they vote our people feel more like consumers of manufactured images than partners in the creation of their world.

I believe that there is great potential in the faith and integrity of the people of God. Robert Coles writes, "There is this young man from Birmingham, Alabama, speaking in 1965: I don't know why I said no to segregation. I'm

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[1]Richard Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square* (Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdman's, 1984), p.vii.

[2]Ibid., p. 19.

just another white Southerner, and I wasn't brought up to love integration! But I was brought up to love Jesus Christ, and when I saw the police of this city use dogs on people, I asked myself what Jesus would have done and that's all I know about how I came to be here on the firing line!"[3]

Community organization can help those large numbers who call on Jesus for guidance to live the implications of that guidance in the public life. It is not for the mental bourgeois who would enjoy the ultimate comfort, that of their convictions. It is for those who mean to act on them, in a faith active in love.

Your Face, Your Cloak Your Coat, Your Feet

> "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." Matthew 5:39b-41

Let's talk about community organization by way of a story which comes to us through Joseph Brodsky in a commencement address.[4] At seven in the morning a guard in a prison camp of the Russian gulag threw open the door of a cell and addressed the inmates. "Citizens! The collective of this prison's guards challenges you, the inmates, to socialist competition in cutting the lumber piled in our yard."

There was no central heating in that part of Russia. All owners were taxed a tenth of their lumber and it was stored in the prison yard. The need for cutting was evident, yet these "socialist competitions" always brutalized the prisoners.

One of the inmates inquired, "What if I refuse to take part in this?"

"Well, in that case, no food for you," replied the guard.

Axes were issued and the cutting began. Both prisoners and guards worked in earnest and by lunchtime all were exhausted, especially the underfed and overworked prisoners. They sat down to eat except for the one who had asked the question. He kept swinging his axe. Guards and prisoners made fun of him. After the break they all kept working. By four in the afternoon the guards quit since their shift had ended. A bit later the inmates quit. The man's axe still kept swinging. He was urged to stop by both parties but he would not. It seemed as if he was possessed of an inexorable rhythm. By five o'clock, by six, the axe was still violently chopping, up and down. All were watching him keenly, and the sardonic look on their faces soon gave way to bewilderment and then terror. By seven-thirty the man finally stopped and staggered to his cell. For the rest of his stay in that prison there were no further calls for socialist competition, even though the wood kept piling higher.

This story moved me powerfully when I read it. It seems a parable of community organization. This seemingly powerless man found a way to participate in the unfolding destiny of his narrowly circumscribed world. Out of the materials at hand he created power (the ability to act), opposed evil and made his neighborhood a little better. He went beyond the oft-quoted maxim from the sermon on the mount to "turn the other cheek" and acted on the verses which follow, "if any man will ... take away thy

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[3]Robert Coles, "New Oxford Review", June, 1982.

[4]Joseph Brodsky, "New York Review of Books," August 16, 1984, p. 7 & 8.

coat, let him have thy cloak also ..." He organized what he had at hand: his axe, his strength, his dignity, his inner rhythm. He devised tactics that made a difference, in this case he rendered evil absurd and dwarfed its demands through the excessive volume of his compliance. This so-called powerless victim exposed the vacuity of the entire enterprise.

The naked public square of American life needs the participation of the people of God. The skewed values and shallow beliefs of much of our mythos in America must be engaged by those who long for signs of God's shalom. Community organization based in parishes is the attempt to put together the disparate cheeks, coats, cloaks, and pairs of feet that are still capable of going a mile or two. These, then, are the materials at hand in our parishes which can be organized.

Institutions: Unlike movements and civic groups and associations which are open to individual membership, the type of organization I am talking about is based in institutions. These institutions are basically churches and synagogues, but could also include other civic organizations which share the values of the organization. An organization of institutions gives more power and stability.

Money: Money is power. It also provides ownership, and the ability to engage the services of the best resources available for training the leadership and consulting on its tasks and actions. The potential economic power of organized institutions can also bring leverage to negotiations. It can keep a branch of a bank in a neighborhood, or lower insurance rates, for example.

People: A letter to a mayor is one thing. Two thousand organized people at a public negotiating session with that same mayor is something else. Organized people mean power. They can fill an auditorium, a courtroom. They vote. Isolated, they are spectators to the making of history. Organized, they have the potential to be their sister's and brother's keepers.

Values and Beliefs: Focused conviction can change the world. Read the book of Acts. The heart of action is word and sacraments. People who believe in the real presence in the bread and wine will yearn for its incarnation in neighbor and community. Churches grow when they invite people to live their beliefs. People want to be part of something which knows what it believes and is serious about living its implications. In fact the life of churches becomes mundane, boring when people are unwilling or unable to act on what they believe. The man willing to swing an axe to the point of collapse, fueled by his inner hopes and longing was able to change a little corner of the gulag.

It is the hope of parish-based community organization that the "fabric" of our churches can be organized to become an instrument through which the hopes of God's people can be stretched out into the public life in effective ways.

An organization of institutions will be committed to several things. These things characterize the ongoing life of a parish-based community organization.

It will be *broad-based.* It will be ecumenical. It will put together different neighborhoods. It will be, if possible, multi-cultural, multi-racial. It will engage the poor and the middle class.

Collective Leadership: Community organization is concerned with the development and empowerment of people. There is a commitment to train leaders. This training takes place in the interplay between action and reflection (a process known these days as "praxis"). It is my experience that passive citizens

have become effective political leaders in the community organizing process. These are some of the people I have watched mature along the way:

A woman from Queens sits in the office of the commissioner of consumer affairs of New York City and confronts him with specific facts about drugs and pornography in her community.

A Catholic sister takes intensive ten-day training in Chicago so that she can learn how to better organize her neighborhood.

A housewife, after being part of a delegation to the Mayor's office comments that she never thought she was able to do something so significant and challenging.

A retired cop negotiates with the corporate executives about bank redlining in a neighborhood.

An insurance salesman negotiates eloquently with a gubernatorial candidate about a toll bridge in his community.

An Ecuadoran immigrant meets with a precinct commander about drugs in his neighborhood's schools.

These are the "little people" politicians lie to, objects of advertiser's hype, the consumers of the myriad solutions of the "planners" and developers; those who must take it when the subways and buses are overcrowded, garbage piles up, buses break down, crime rises, apartments go condo and the air goes foul. These are the "rats" put in a maze of planning boards, community relations specialists, and every kind of bureaucratic red tape—all of which keep people from real control of their destiny.

I have seen them become women and men of dignity, courage, and considerable skill. They are resilient, with a winsome hope. They are trying on their faith in their journey to freedom.

Multiple Issues. Groups which deal with just one issue are movements. What is being described here is not a single issue movement or panacea for utopia but the creation of an instrument which can be useful to churches, families, and neighborhoods as they deal with the mix of challenges and issues of their lives. There ought to be a healthy blend of local, self-interest type issues and regional and corporate issues. If community organization can really be the means of entree into the public arena for church people, then the possibility exists that they can also be engaged in the larger peace and justice issues raised by their denominations.

A Commitment to Action. I recently attended a meeting in a large New Jersey city about the housing crisis in the face of gentrification. The meeting included presentations by academics, religious leaders, and local activists. As I watched the flow of the meeting it occurred to me that the people who were intensely and passionately participating really believed that this meeting was itself the focus of the action. There was no strategy (beyond plans for the next meeting!) for empowerment of the neighborhood people and churches to go into action around the issues being passionately discussed. The meeting seemed cathartic to some. To me it was a waste of time.

Action is the oxygen of any organization. In action leaders emerge, real friends and enemies surface, values are tested, respect is forged, social change becomes a possibility. Actions—be they a eucharist or baptism, a mass meeting with a mayor, a visit to the tax assessor's office to locate owners of abandoned buildings, are the matrix in which faith is formed and fed, evidence of a vibrant hope, signs of the Kingdom.

The People Own the Organization. Hard money, raised and spent by the people themselves guarantees that they will own their own organization. This

ownership is a powerful motivating and organizational force.

In organizing projects in Brooklyn and Queens (and now in New Jersey) the religious institutions raised thousands of dollars of their own money before they sat down with their church bodies and local businesses and proposed funding partnerships. A good example of the power of local ownership of the project comes out of the East Brooklyn Churches organization. In an area of intense poverty the people are attempting to rebuild their neighborhood through Project Nehemiah. New homes are being built on the rubble of a ravaged neighborhood, homes accessible to the local residents. The key was the ability of EBC to negotiate among the denominations and layers of city, state, federal, and private interests. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod put six million dollars of mission money into the finance pool. The Roman Catholics and Episcopalians added many millions more. From the city EBC negotiated free land, $10,000 per home and tax abatements. From the state and Governor Cuomo they won permanent financial assistance with ten per cent of the mortgage money. To my mind one of the most amazing things that happened was when the Reverend Johnny Ray Youngblood, the pastor of a Black Baptist church, presented a special donation to the Catholic and Anglican bishops in attendance at his church. The donation, a check for $100,000, had been raised by 100 of Youngblood's parishioners, each of whom loaned $1000 to the pastor at no interest. We are a long way here from denominational paternalism or dependence. The white churches got their act together. The Black churches got their act together. Each denomination got their act together. They moved from strength to strength into the public arena. They are showing us all the power of ownership in the process of community building.

Mike Gecan, their Industrial Area's Foundation organizer is quoted in the National Catholic Reporter. "Not only is this incredible in terms of the large amount of money raised by St. Paul's parishioners, it is also fantastic in terms of an individual church in a central city giving to something that is so purely economical, multi-racial, and multi-denominational. But the people believe very deeply in Nehemiah and it's their way of investing in their future, as well as everybody else's future, here in Brownsville."[5]

A Commitment to Build Power. Power is the ability to act on one's values with effectiveness. The commitment to build an instrument to empower people's participation in decisions which shape their lives means an intention to find allies, common ground, to break through the wall that separates city from suburb, Geneva from Rome from Jerusalem, poor from middle class, white from black, young from old. Power demands accountability, mutual respect, and care. We are too often divided from one another by those who stand to gain from our mutual alienations. A new rainbow coalition with muscle can be a new form of ecumenical prayer, the offering up of the organized coats, cloaks, and shoes of the people of God for the sake of the world for which Christ died.

Can Anything Good Come Out of New Jersey?

North New Jersey is like the Balkans in Eastern Europe. It is a series of enclaves, one on top of the other, of differing

[5]"National Catholic Reporter", October 19, 1984, p. 14.

ethnicity, race, class, culture, and economy. Say northern New Jersey is a body of water. Throw a stone in it and watch the ripples spread in concentric circles. The stone lands in Bogota/Hackensack, the location of my parish. Immediately surrounding the church are the quiet, tree lined streets of a working class neighborhood of aging housing. It is ethnically diverse, with growing Hispanic and Asian populations. The ripples spread out a mile, they reach the low income housing projects of Newman Street in Hackensack to the west and a luxury condo being built in Teaneck to the east. Within three miles the ripples include the George Washington Bridge to Manhattan, wealthy suburbs to the north and large concentrations of industry to the south. To the east, by the bridge, is the largest concentration of Japanese outside of Japan. The ripples stretch out five miles. They touch Paterson to the west. They touch Passaic. They flow into Hudson County and the largest concentration of Cuban Mariel refugees outside of Miami. To the east we are already through Harlem and into the South Bronx, to Columbia University and Union Seminary. To the north we have covered four of the largest suburban shopping malls in the country.

In the midst of balkanized northern New Jersey lies a marshy and industrial wasteland five miles west of Manhattan. It is being transformed. Its transformation provides us with a parable of the issues, possibilities, tactics, and difficulties of the community organization process.

The master plan for the Hackensack Meadowlands District calls for an eventual population of over one hundred thousand, a daily work force of one hundred and twenty five thousand, and thousands of spectators at sporting and cultural events. Much has been developed already. The ripples of this huge development are affecting the life of the aging blue collar towns and cities and suburbs surrounding it and their million and a half people.

Will the new city, and the transformed region have a soul? The process of legislating, financing, planning, and executing so unique, sophisticated, and complicated a plan as the Hackensack Meadowlands Development has left the public square naked. There has been no input from churches, synagogues, or non-profit agencies. They are "permitted" a presence—if they can afford the two hundred thousand dollars an acre, and that acre is not in the middle of a swamp. Their presence is not *planned.*

Bishop John Spong of the Newark Diocese of the Episcopal Church said, "I cannot imagine a community of over one hundred thousand people anywhere not being concerned for those spiritual and service institutions that make any community more than just bricks and mortar." What is the meaning of this city?

Surrounding churches and neighborhoods have also been left out of the conversation with developers, financiers, and layers of governmental power on decisions which are shaping the entire region: economics, land use, jobs, transportation, housing, toxic waste, dumping and incineration, gentrification, the air. There is a growing sense of alienation and dislocation. Massive transformation and development of the Hudson waterfront and the Meadowlands is leaving the various balkanized entities of northern New Jersey in dire need of cohesion, vision, and power.

A referendum on a horse racing facility was roundly defeated by the electorate. It was built anyway.

Neighborhoods in Jersey City are

displacing the poor as their brownstones are being renovated.

A state mandate to include in plans for new development a portion of affordable housing for the poor and middle class is ignored, even publically defied by the Harz Mountain Corporation.

Sensible citizens are beginning to see that "hearings" and "referendums" are just hoops through which the powerless pass. Deals are cut elsewhere. Faced with unaccountable development and change people usually react in one of two ways. They become reactive and oppose all that is new. They usually lose. Or they retreat from the public arena in resigned powerlessness. There is a better way. People, using the discipline of community organization, fueled by their beliefs and common sense, can create an instrument which will give them the power and analysis to sit at the table where decisions are made. Speaking from their faith commitment they can participate in the shaping of a world in some ways reflective of their yearnings for the Kingdom of God.

Anatomy of an Organization

What follows is the unfolding of an organization effort in northern New Jersey, an attempt to assist the laos of God in our churches to be the church militant in our moment of history. It is not offered as a blueprint, but an illustration or parable of how some folks are attempting to merge theory with reality. We have made a lot of mistakes. North Jersey is a quirky place. What worked in Queens, Brooklyn, or Jersey may not necessarily work in your city or region. But sooner or later true organization and most Christian ministry deteriorates into hard work. Here is a brief chronicle of our deterioration.

First came a commitment to action. There is no organization until a group of leaders decides to become engaged in real action. A commitment to social change is first, followed by an exploration of tactics. The challenges in northern New Jersey led to the formation of Meadowlands Ministries in 1982. Its purpose is to facilitate the action and negotiation of the various member denominations as they seek a partnership in the creation of human community in their transforming region. The East Coast Synod of the AELC joined on behalf of all Lutherans and have since been joined by the ALC and LCA. Together with the Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, United Churches of Christ, Presbyterians, and Methodists they are participating in a common strategy and negotiations with developers and officials. Among other things, Lutherans hope to enable the start of a Word and Sacrament ministry within three years in the new metropolis of the Meadowlands. This would be impossible without the ability of Meadowlands Ministries to negotiate a presence for the churches.

There is a commitment to seeking clarity about power. Meadowlands Ministries has begun the research to determine how decisions are made. Members have been attending meetings of the Hackensack Meadowlands District Commission, identifying themselves, asking questions, establishing institutional relationships with those in power. This ongoing analysis of the flow of power in the region helps to demystify our region's transformation and provides insight into our emerging strategy.

There is a commitment to negotiation and compromise. Community organizations exist to gain concrete results for their people. Our negotiations have resulted in agreements for the acquisition of strategic campuses for the

presence of non-profit institutions in the midst of the new developments. Because land values have skyrocketed to such a degree, there has also been negotiated the principle that this land will be donated by developers, and that percentages of the building costs will also be absorbed by developers. A plan for a day care center has been adapted between Harz Mountain (the builders who would foot the bill) and a West New York Lutheran Church. Without organization, power, and a common ecumenical strategy these advancements in the evangelization of the church would have been impossible.

There is a commitment to the empowerment of local churches and neighborhoods. A grassroots coalition of neighborhood parishes is being formed under Meadowlands Ministries. It is envisioned that this grassroots organization will lend power and direction to the above-mentioned negotiations, while the contacts and relationships which have been forged will benefit churches on a local level. What follows is an outline of the development of this grassroots organization.

1. A five week training session was offered three times in 1983. Seventy five clergy and laity attended, an ecumenical group also diverse racially, ethnically, and from both city and suburb. Pastors experienced in community organization led the sessions which included prayer and Bible study, analysis of issues in church and neighborhood, and workshops in the discipline and tactics of community organization.

2. Out of these training sessions came an overwhelming commitment to stay together as a group and promote the formation of the type of organization we have been discussing in this paper. Participants made appointments with their pastors and key fellow members to explain the process and seek their participation in the organizing effort.

3. We are now putting together a sponsoring committee for our projected organization. We have organized commitments for a dues-paying base of twenty parishes. The raising of the dues insures ownership and direction of the effort will remain with the participants. This phase has included visits of parish priests and pastors, workshops led by guests who are leaders of similar organizations, presentations to vestries and parish councils, and many individual interviews.

4. Although recruitment is an ongoing task, we now have the necessary funds and parish institutions in place to move on to the next phase. This sponsoring committee will now interview and hire a professional organizer to train and lead the organization. The difficult work of community organization is finally best left to the professionals. There is a place for seasoned clergy and laity, and collective leadership is one of the goals and benefits of the process. But the professional must be out in front. Organizing a community into a solid, responsible, and responsive instrument for social change cannot be left to diletantes who have read a few books or led a protest or two. I have met many organizers. In my opinion the legacy of Alinsky, the Industrial Areas Foundation, is the best. Their support network includes consultative backup for the organizer, continuous opportunities for training and suggestions for personnel. But there are many organizers around from many different networks. Good ones are worth the effort to find, and the money to commit to the seriousness of the organizing effort.

There is a commitment to an ongoing life of action, recruitment, negotiation, training, and reflection. Now priorities

are set. There will be several issues which will set the agenda. There will be plans made for large public negotiating sessions around these issues. These sessions often happen in the form of conventions. Our issues in New Jersey will include:

Jobs: A lot of people who formerly worked in the now closed factories are unemployed. A strong organization can negotiate a percentage of jobs as a result of the boom in our area to go to our people.

Housing: In a region which is almost entirely poor, blue collar, or middle class the major type of housing being created is luxury. A strong organization can negotiate a percentage of new housing to be accessible to the poor, the middle class, to the large number of senior citizens. The boom is also spurring a gentrification and "condo" movement in the old cities of the area, as reported in the pages of *Currents* in a recent issue by Tom Sinnott of Jersey City. We plan to forge alliances with groups working on these issues so that growth doesn't have to mean displaced persons.

Environment: A strong organization can help our people say NO to those who have for years indiscriminately dumped on our air, water, and land. The high rate of some cancers and other diseases in our area has been too high a price to pay.

Social Issues: The homeless are legion. Victims of domestic violence proliferate. North Jersey is a center of drug trade. An organization which puts together the fragmented pieces of our balkanized region can begin to analyze and minister to these, and many other local needs and issues.

In Yankee Stadium in 1980 the pope said the following: "The city needs a soul and the people must give it." Church folks in our metropolitan area are right now going through difficult rites of passage in the public articulation of their faith. It is our hope that the churches, families, and neighborhood will want to be a part of the "soul work" of the city. We trust that if we represent that care about the soul of the city clearly, responsibly, and with power to those who are reshaping our region, that they will work with us to ensure that they do not build a place where the only answer to the Stranger is, "We all dwell together to make money from each other."

Converging Paths?

While in Queens I was privileged to be a part of the maturing organizating of thirty five thousand families rooted in churches and neighborhoods, an organization of incredible diversity. I saw the Queens Citizen's Organization stand up to the mayor of New York and win on many local issues. I saw them negotiate with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and win several million dollars for improvements in neighborhoods in which the authority does business. I saw abandoned buildings again become habitable. I saw QCO cut arson in our borough by 13% (the only borough with a decrease in the city) after a year-long campaign of strategy and negotiation with those who make decisions. I saw signs of hope in neighborhoods: drug busts, revitalization of business strips, the addition of a police precinct, the installation of traffic lights, institutionalized relationships with those in power. I saw nothing else during my time in Queens which forged such hope, such ecumenical ties, such pride and dignity.

There are such groups, large and small, all across our country. A few are known to me through friends involved in them. One pastor organizes woodcutters

in Mississippi, using the churches as a base; an AELC church in Roslindale (Boston) is part of an organization which has brought needed city service (such as a registry) back into the neighborhood. Another AELC pastor organizes among Latinos in San Francisco. Another Lutheran pastor participates in an Industrial Areas Foundation project in Madison, Wisconsin.

Community organization is an instrument for pilgrims and exiles on their spiritual journey. It is an instrument for ongoing engagement with life, for those who would heed Jeremiah's call to the exiles: "build your cities ... have your babies ... plant your gardens ... seek the welfare of the city in which I have placed you in exile ... pray for it ..." It is not an instrument for those who have adopted a radical apocalyptic stance, that all of life is Babylon, only a new heaven and a new earth will do (Stringfellow, Yoder, others). It is not for those whose only witness is to turn the other cheek. In other words it is not for those who have rejected politics or power as a legitimate expression of Christian love and witness. It is for those who would find their coats, cheeks, pairs of feet, put them together, and live in affirmation of the God of history, still incarnate in the struggle for the soul of Babylon.

There are several good reasons why I believe that churches, pastors, and denominations ought to consider the converging paths of parish ministry and community organization:

A grassroots organization will provide an organized constituency in a given area which can hold accountable the layers of public and private institutions involved in creating or destroying the fabric of the community. It could have the power, credibility, and skill to represent the interests of the churches and its families with those in power.

It will provide allies to isolated churches and neighborhoods.

It will provide training for a congregation's pastor and leadership: in how to energize the social ministries and evangelism efforts of the parish; how to identify, research, devise tactics, and win on local and regional issues; as a training ground for parish leadership, the organization will return to the churches leaders who know how to run a meeting, negotiate, proposition others, act on an issue, raise money, relate the faith to the public arena.

It will place the activity of the church in the middle of the world, the world of doubt and struggle where the mass of unchurched people can come into contact with the love and concern of the People of God. It is a means of evangelization.

It will develop skill in a strategic planning.

It will provide an instrument for ecumenical and multi-cultural engagement in the life of the world for which Christ died, and in which He is even now present. There is a widening of the dimension of living out the meaning and implications of Baptism and Eucharist.

Our Present Kairos

In John Gardner's retelling of the classic Beowulf epic from the viewpoint of the monster, *Grendel,* there is a scene where Grendel is secretly watching the priests of the tribe going through their liturgies before the pantheon. He remarks: "There is no conviction in the old priests' songs; there is only showmanship. No one in the Kingdom is convinced that the gods have life in them. The weak observe the rituals—take their hats off, put them on again, raise their arms,

moan, intone, press their palms together—but no one harbors unreasonable expectations."[6]

We know more than we are willing to tell and act. Our rituals have such inherent, subversive power for those who believe them. But it is the rituals of the uncommitted, practiced apart from the world of action and reaction, of dying and being born, that lead to the great indifference of God's people in the face of the great issues of justice, peace, hunger, oppression, community building. Can the converging paths of congregation and community organization provide a means of renewal for the new emerging Lutheran communion which would seriously engage its people in the life of the world via serious prayer, liturgy, ecumenism, and action?

Is it possible that seminaries might seek out pastors and lay leaders who are serious about community organization to share what they know as a part of the vocational formation of our pastors? Will seminaries and denomination people take up the invitation made by institutes such as the Industrial Areas Foundation to provide training and exposure in the discipline of community organization? Will those who lobby, and draft theological statements on social and community issues be intentional about developing within their constituencies the power needed to live and act by these values? Will those working on various "justice" agendas be willing to involve the people in the quid pro quo arrangements and negotiations which build the power to actually get their hands on and shape the city around these agendas?

I believe that we do not have to choose between loveless power or powerless love. Let there be ongoing dialogue between parishes, pastors, theologians, and bishops about the use and abuse of power, means and ends, self interest and solidarity, the cosmic nature of baptism, eucharist and ministry, love which is politically informed, justice, public issues as concrete examples of our beliefs, the example of Jesus.

Finally, I would like to make the readers an offer. If you are presently engaged in some form of community organizing, or would like to pursue this means of living our faith commitments, I would like to hear from you. I will compile the information about what you are doing, about where you are struggling and hoping. I will summarize that information and mail it to you.[7] Maybe we need to support and encourage one another from time to time. Lutherans need to rediscover a two-handed God as we seek to live as signs of the Kingdom.

John Gardner says in *Grendel,* "Only in a world where everything is patently being lost can a priest stir men's hearts as a poet would by maintaining that nothing is in vain."[8]

The city needs a soul and the people must give it.

In the name of Jesus, let us never dare harbor reasonable expectations.

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[6]John Gardner, *Grendel* (New York: Ballantine, 1972), p. 111.

[7]My address for your response to the article, and continuing communication on the church and community organization: Stephen P. Bouman, 145 W. Grove Street, Bogota, New Jersey, 07603.

[8]Gardner, p. 111.

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Schweitzer on Bach: In Quest of the "Musician-Poet"

Endel Kallas
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Whereas his efforts as an African jungle doctor, theologian, Lutheran pastor, philosopher, and peace advocate have been more widely acclaimed, Albert Schweitzer has never drawn significant public attention for his study and interpretation of Johann Sebastian Bach. However little his study of Bach has been remembered, Albert Schweitzer hardly should be forgotten during this Tricentenary observance honoring the musician he most admired. Indeed, it might be argued that our century owes virtually as much to the literary and musical expertise of Schweitzer as it does to Bach himself. Church organists can properly praise Schweitzer, for it was through his personal effort, along with that of the French musician Charles-Marie Widor, that the *Complete Organ Works of Bach* appeared early in our century.[1] During his prolific literary career, Schweitzer also penned two major books on Bach, the first written in French and the second a German study of greater proportion.[2] However much we pay tribute to Bach during the Tricentenary celebration this year, *the* individual who strove most to bring about renewed appreciation of his music for our 20th century also should not be overlooked: Albert Schweitzer.

Albert Schweitzer began his investigation of Bach with a clear sense that musical scholarship of the 19th century had by no means exhausted the field of study. At the suggestion of Widor who regretted the absence of any French book on Bach apart from purely biographical accounts, Schweitzer set his sights on a wholly new appraisal. "With good courage," Schweitzer later remarked, "I resigned myself to my fate."[3] He was personally destined to pen a treatise on Bach once previous books had been thoroughly reviewed.

Schweitzer carried out his investigation with the deliberate intention of interpreting Bach very differently from his immediate predecessors of the latter 19th century and, more particularly, Philipp Spitta. In the development of his own monumental study *Johann Sebastian Bach* (Leipzig, 1880), Philipp Spitta similarly hoped to chart a new course for the interpretation of the musician and his music.[4] Until Spitta, German literary studies of Bach were little more than biographical sketches with limited attention to the study of his music *per se*. By comparison, Spitta felt it to be his "duty" to go beyond biography and give attention to the nature of Bach's music. The result was the publication of two weighty volumes on Bach, which in English translation cover over 1700 pages! According to Spitta, his investigation opened the way for a more "com-

[1]Cf. Albert Schweitzer and Charles-Marie Widor, *J.S. Bach Complete Organ Works* (New York: G. Shirmer, 1913).

[2]Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949), pp. 60ff.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 60.

[4]Philipp Spitta, *Johann Sebastian Bach*, vol. I (New York: Dover, 1951), pp. viiiff.

prehensive picture" of Bach. After his painstaking inquiry into virtually every known fact about the life of Bach and with new concern to analyze the "pure" form of his music, Spitta confidently concluded his last chapter with a candid remark: "It will not be possible that Bach should be forgotten so long as the German people exist."[5]

While surely not inclined to forget Spitta, Schweitzer felt the need to expand once again the study of Bach and illumine aspects of the *nature* of his music which still remained unexplored. Spitta may well have bequeathed to latter 19th century musical scholarship a more "comprehensive picture" of Bach, but, for the 20th century, Schweitzer took upon himself the special task of probing more deeply into the quality of Bach's music.

The way in which Spitta and Schweitzer begin their respective studies on Bach will demonstrate a critical shift in interpretative perspective. Spitta opens his account with a straightforward historical observation: "The family of which J.S. Bach was a descendent was thoroughly German, and can be traced to its home in Thuringia, even before the time of the Reformation."[6] The style is deliberate and reflects little more concern than to state plain historical fact. By contrast, Schweitzer in his German study totally ignores biography or the question of German descent. According to Schweitzer, Bach is less a German than a "universal personality," the significance of which is explored in the development of his investigation.[7] Avoiding biography, Schweitzer focuses immediately on Bach, the "artist," whose character of music is contrasted with that of Richard Wagner:

> Some artists are subjective, some objective. The art of the former has its source in the personality; the work is almost independent of the epoch in which they live ... Of this type is Richard Wagner. Bach belongs to the order of the objective artist. They are wholly of their own time and work out within the forms and ideas that their time proffers them.[8]

The shift from Spitta to Schweitzer should be clear enough. Spitta is still far more the 19th century historian of music for whom aesthetics and artistry are secondarily important. Schweitzer, however, pays immediate attention to the unique "artistry" of Bach. According to Schweitzer, the music of Bach can be interpreted aesthetically from the standpoint of "objectivity." At the very heart of Schweitzer's new appraisal is concern not for matters of biography, but the nature of the musical "artistry" of Bach. In later years, Schweitzer similarly recounted: "As a musician, I wanted to talk (in the Bach book) to other musicians about Bach's music. The main subject of my work, therefore, should be, so I resolved, what in most books hitherto had been much too slightly treated, namely an explanation of the real nature of Bach's music ..."[9] Though also not forgetful of biography, Schweitzer in the development of his treatise made no effort to conceal his *new* interpretative scheme for the greater elaborations of the "artistry" of Bach's musical compositions.

Schweitzer readily disclosed the pivotal argument in his new interpretation within the title of his first literary

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[5] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 278.
[6] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 1.
[7] Albert Schweitzer, *J.S. Bach*, vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 2.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[9] Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought*, p. 61.

study on Bach written in French. The French title read: "J.S. Bach: Le Musicien-Poéte."[10] It was surely not accidental that the subtitle "musicien-poete" with emphasis on the poetic was selected by Schweitzer. With the phrase "musicien-poete," Schweitzer effectively argued that the music of Bach not only combined the basic ingredients of melody, harmony, rhythm, and timbre, but, more importantly, also contained a "poetic" or "pictorial" dimension. In other words, Schweitzer based his interpretation of Bach on a new appreciation of his musical compositions that were anything but "pure" music, but heavily laden with visual and poetic imagery. According to Schweitzer, this new perception of Bach's music had never been recognized or explored by Spitta,[11] and, therefore, there was critical need to consider anew the thought that Bach was nothing more than a musician. To the contrary, concluded Schweitzer, Bach was primarily a *poet* whose medium of expression was music.

With this new emphasis on the "poetic quality of Bach's musical compositions, Schweitzer was also breaking down stiff 19th century academic distinctions according to which poetry and music were clearly distinguished. That music could or should be more than pure sound, but also embody a poetic or descriptive dimension was critical to Schweitzer. "For some," Schweitzer noted, "descriptive music is nothing less than the final goal of all music; for others, it represents the degeneration of pure music."[12] The distinction was more than academic to Schweitzer; indeed, it indicated his basic shift from Philipp Spitta. Unlike Spitta, Schweitzer scorned the latter and applauded the former in his new appraisal of Bach. In his French study of Bach, Schweitzer spoke directly to the thrust of his argument:

> Bach was a poet; and the poet was at the same time a painter. This is not at all a paradox. We have a habit of classifying artists according to the means they use to interpret their inner life: musicians if they use sounds, painters if they use colors, poets if they use words. but we must admit that these categories, established by external criteria, are very arbitrary. The soul of an artist is a complex whole, in which mingle in proportions infinitely varied gifts of the poet, the painter, the musicians. (Joy, p. 123)

From the vantage point of Schweitzer, Bach simply defied neat academic characterizations. Indeed, Schweitzer preferred to speak of the artist Bach basically as a "poet" through whose music rich and vibrant images were projected no less effectively than the painter. "There is," Schweitzer suggested, "a painter in every musician."

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[10]Charles R. Joy, ed., *Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 68. This volumn contains a fine partial translation of Schweitzer's French study.

[11]*Ibid.*, pp. 130-131. Schweitzer writes: "Spitta, whose profound acquaintance with the works of Bach put him in a position to see things clearly, has a fear of carrying his researches in that direction (of descriptive music). When he cannot do otherwise, he confesses that such and such a page contains descriptive music; and is always sure to add that is there purely by accident, to which one would be wrong to attach any importance." Spitta, in the preface of his Bach study, does openly admit his bias against the "ideal" of descriptive music. He writes: "In considering Bach's own compositions, I have, of course, attributed the greatest weight to the element of form, in proportion as an exact scientific estimation of this is more possible than the ideal element. Still, I could not regard myself as justified in altogether neglecting this, and so leaving undone a part of my task ..." Cf. Spitta, *J.S. Bach,* vol. 1, pp. vii-viii.

[12]Charles R. Joy, ed., *Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer,* p. 125.

(Joy, p. 126) Accordingly, the medium of music simply did not adequately define for Schweitzer the unique and complex artistry of Johann Sebastian Bach.

In support of his basic argument, Schweitzer compared the musical artistry of Bach far more favorably with Michelangelo than Mozart and Handel. The peculiarity of this alignment is highly significant, for once again it is not the musical medium but instead the "genre" of Bach's artistry that holds greatest importance to Schweitzer. From his standpoint, the music of Mozart and Handel compare so unfavorably with that of Bach, in that the former manifest an antagonism between "poetic text and musical phrase." The contrary, argues Schweitzer, is apparent in Bach. Schweitzer relates:

> Mozart is purely a musician; he takes a given text and clothes it in beautiful music. Bach, on the other hand, digs in it; he explores it through, until he has found the idea which in his eyes represents the head of it and which he will have to illustrate in music ... In Handel we often perceive a (similar) latent antagonism between the words of the poetic text and the musical phrase super-imposed on it." (Joy, p. 129)

By contrast, Schweitzer aligns the painter Michelangelo and the musician Bach, both of whose artistic expressions evolve out of and develop fully in accord with a primary poetic "text." Though distinct by artistic "genre," Michelangelo and Bach stand shoulder to shoulder in the eyes of Schweitzer by the way their artistic expressions seize upon a "text," draw out significance and, finally, translate it into artistic form, whether on canvas or through music. "If it had been possible," commented Schweitzer, "for Bach to see a picture of Michelangelo, he would have found something in his own soul." (Joy, p. 68) However much Schweitzer valued the technical musical expertise of Bach, it was more so his ability to move from "text" to musical expression that placed his artistry alongside the great Michelangelo.

By the same token, the "text" upon which Schweitzer based this critical affinity between Michelangelo and Bach was the sacred biblical tradition of the Christian church. Accordingly, Schweitzer lauded Bach so enthusiastically for his skill at translating biblical texts and biblical imagery into musical compositions. The church cantatas, preludes, passions, and chorales only took on concrete form, argued Schweitzer, once Bach had thoroughly extricated whatever theme or subject appeared in the primary textual material within the Bible. While Schweitzer never identified a parallel phenomenon, the Sunday sermon might serve well for illustration. What a preacher is expected to do is draw out meaning from the biblical narrative and, then, communicate it through the medium of speech to the congregation. In Bach, Schweitzer observed, the identical methodology was operative, only the medium was not the oral word but music. In the development of his musical compositions, the artist Bach thus followed this procedure in a step by step fashion: biblical stories or images were translated into expressive motifs; motifs took on concrete form in musical notes; notes were combined into musical phrases; phrases were built into musical compositions; the compositions—canatas, preludes, etc.—finally communicated the significance of the original literary text. The final product was nothing less than a sermon in

musical form. With this in mind, Schweitzer began his French study of Bach with the observation:

> As such Bach composed for the service of worship. His cantatas and Passions were destined to find a place in the liturgy, and he did not imagine that one day they would be given outside the service.[13]

Schweitzer argued conclusively that Bach cannot be properly classed a "musician" without an appreciation for his poetic genius and concern to communicate religious truth. In the mind of Schweitzer, Bach never composed "pure music," nor were his musical compositions written merely for "entertainment." To consider the music of Bach as "pure," argued Schweitzer, would be to pay heed only to external form without regard to poetic character and religious content. Schweitzer similarly opposed the music of Bach to "entertainment." Rather, Bach composed his musical compositions not for the sake of any pleasurable titilation of the ear, but for the human heart and mind that they might give rightful glory to the "most high God." In short, Schweitzer perceived in the music of Bach depth and dimension beyond "pure form." The depth of his music discloses a poetic quality; the dimension of his music embodies a religious component. Were our 20th century to lose sight of this, Schweitzer feared, the loss would be great indeed.

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[13]Albert Schweitzer, *J.S. Bach,* vol. I, p. 167.



A Book Worth Discussing: A Commentary on the Gospel of John*

Robert H. Smith
Christ Seminary-Seminex
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This long-awaited commentary on the Fourth Gospel is a first-class disappointment.

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But what about the content of the commentary? Perhaps it was inevitable that it fails to live up to its advance billing. We heard years ago: "Haenchen is producing a major commentary on John." His commentary on Acts is a powerful work, and we hoped the volume on John might be of the same caliber. Haenchen published major essays on many Johannine topics and wrote a stream of book reviews for *Theologische Literaturzeitung*. He and his assistants produced reams of material on the latest literature in the field of Johannine studies for *Theologische Rundschau*. He immersed himself in the gnostic writings discovered at Nag Hammadi. We expected a major commentary offering a fresh perspective.

Unfortunately the commentary before us is a patchwork. Haunchen died at the age of 80 in 1975, without having come close to completing the work. What we have in front of us is a memorial and thankoffering produced by Frau Margit Haenchen and Ulrich Busse, Haenchen's erstwhile assistant and colleague. They pieced this commentary together out of bits of notes and portions of drafts, filling in the many gaps with material harvested from Haunchen's essays and even from his reviews. What has resulted is an odd work.

In some ways of course the commentary mirrors the gospel itself. The reader will continually be asking, "Who wrote what and when? What is to be ascribed to Haenchen and what to his editors or redactors? And how much derives from the early Haenchen and how much from the later?

Haenchen, for better or worse, was very much interested in the question of the sources of the Fourth Gospel. No other question so captures his attention. Like many others, Haenchen thinks that it is necessary to distinguish among 1) the writer of a source, 2) the Evangelist, and 3) a later redactor or editor. Unlike most others, Haenchen thinks of the author of the source (an entire gospel) as a literary genius and poet with a deficient theology, the Evangelist as a plodding and prosaic author (who thankfully wrote very little of the Gospel) and a correct theologian, and the redactor is of course orthodox in his interests in

**By Ernest Haenchen. Translated by Robert Funk. Edited by Robert Funk with Ulrich Busse. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984. 674 pages. Cloth. 2 Volumes. Each volume $34.95.*

apocalyptic eschatology and sacraments.

However, the presentation of the differing roles of source, Evangelist, and redactor in John 3, for example, is very confused and confusing. Mostly Haenchen is in dialogue with Bultmann on matters of source and wishes to offer criticisms rather than constructive alternatives. But this conversation on sources consumes a major share of Haenchen's attention and energy.

We are offered little by way of linguistic analysis. The full RSV(!) text is printed out, section by section. Six Greek words are cited in the commentary on ch. 9. It is hard to think of Haenchen's analysis of that chapter (and some others) as anything but superficial. Perhaps Haenchen felt that ample philological help is readily available and that he need not occupy himself with details of vocabulary and syntax.

He cannot be said to be particularly interested in literary structure, either. Once in a while he offers an analysis and seems to me to be wide of the mark. He cites J.L. Martyn in his bibliography but has learned nothing from Martyn about the structure of ch. 9, the theology of the Evangelist, or the setting of the community. He cites Brown on the trial before Pilate (18:28-19:16a) but misses the shift from outside to inside in 19:9 to say nothing about a chiastic arrangement of this material or any other in the Gospel.

What would be immensely useful, in view of all the good commentaries we have on John, would be a commentary informed by literary criticism, but all such concerns are too new to have affected Haenchen. Nothing appears in this commentary on the distinctions among real author, implied author, and narrator, or between real and implied readers, or on plot, delineation of characters, and the literary uses of such plot devices as irony, misunderstanding, and symbolism.

We are given no sketch of a Johannine community and nothing is said of the social setting of the Evangelist, the experience of excommunication from the synagogue, or of the psychology of outsiders.

James Robinson in his Foreword mentions Haenchen's study of the Gnostic Gospel. In his discussion of the Prologue, Haenchen rejects the Gnostic connection in favor of an adaptation of the Jewish Wisdom myth.

One final negative comment. The reader will look in vain for any illumination regarding the high christology of the Fourth Gospel and the manner in which it portrays the path of descent and ascent traveled by the Son. Haenchen does not seem even to grapple with these matters.

What then are the uses of this commentary? In the first place, its publication is an act of homage to a great scholar. It is a kind of Festshrift, celebrating the life and scholarship of Ernst Haenchen.

In the second place, if these volumes are a disappointment in terms of breaking new ground they are useful for reminding us of the ground scholarship has traveled. Malatesta's well-known Johannine bibliography covers the years 1920-1965. Haenchen and his assistants could have contented themselves with bringing the list up to 1984, the year of publication in English (or 1980, the date of the German edition). What they have done is to collect materials all the way back to 1800.

And Haenchen dialogues with his contemporaries (he was born in 1894) and his teachers. This is an old man's book, looking back, assessing the path scholarship has trod, offering his judgments on that path.

A Book Worth Discussing: Canon and Community. A Guide to Canonical Criticism.*

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This book offers a brief introduction to the comparatively new discipline of canonical criticism, as practised by one of its two leading proponents (the other, Brevard Childs, dislikes the term canonical criticism and construes the discipline somewhat differently from Sanders, as will be explained below).

In a prologue entitled "Spirit and Community" Sanders advocates, in my opinion appropriately, a view of inspiration that does not restrict the concept to individual spiritual giants standing at the beginning of the canonical process (Jeremiah, say, or Paul) but that sees the Spirit at work in the whole process, as believing communities use, repeat, and modify normative traditions. Then, in a chapter entitled "Reasons Why," he justifies canonical criticism, partly out of a sense of the inadequacies of historical criticism and its successors/competitors (pneumatic, structuralist, political, or psychological interpretation, for example). Sanders appears more consciously appreciative of the benefits of earlier and current modes of biblical interpretation than Brevard Childs, whose dislike for the term "canonical criticism" stems in part from a fear that the new discipline will be seen merely as one more criticism rather than as the whole new way of construing the task of interpretation. Another "reason why" is Sanders' conviction that traditionally the investigation of the canonization of scripture has tended to focus on counciliar decisions of religious leaders rather than on a process within the communities of faith (Sanders sees rabbinic leaders and bishops acknowledging what books their respective communities have found useful rather than pontificating what can/cannot be read).

Canonical criticism á la Sanders has two central focuses: 1) canonical process and 2) canonical hermeneutics, which are, in turn, the themes of the book's two central chapters. "Canonical process" is Sanders' phrase for the long history that begins when a religious community repeats and modifies an earlier tradition or world view (showing thereby that this traditional material possesses for the community some degree of authoritative/canonical status). Though there were periods of "intense canonical process"—the sixth century B.C.E. (the exile) and the first century C.E. (destruction of the temple and loss of the land)—in which the process moved toward some fixity, yielding, respectively, a torah of five books and a collection of a specific number of scriptures whose texts are becoming less and less flexible, Sanders sees the canonical process contin-

By James A. Sanders, Guides to Biblical Scholarship, Old Testament Series. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984. 96 pages. Paper. $4.50.

uing unabated to this day, as believing Jewish and Christian communities use these materials from the past in ever new ways to ask the ever old questions about identity and way of life.

The term "canonical process" can be used to highlight the differences between Sanders and Childs, the former stressing *process,* the latter, *canonical.* In Childs' *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), the stress is on the present canonical shape of the text: i.e., whatever the exilic author of Isaiah 40-55 may have intended, what is the meaning of Deutero-Isaiah as it now lies imbedded in the 66 chapter book of Isaiah? or, whatever the earlier sources of the Pentateuch may have meant to teach, what is the message of Genesis or indeed of the whole five book torah? As an example of what the five book shape of the torah might mean, consider an idea of Sanders, developed in an earlier book, *Torah and Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972). Whereas various biblical recitals of God's care for Israel often include the following events: exodus, wandering, conquest of the land, establishment and preservation of a Davidic dynasty centering in Zion (events whose story is told from Genesis through 2 Kings), it is significant for Sanders that the five book torah—for all time Israel's focal norm—is rounded off, with Deuteronomy, as a canonical story that excludes the book (Joshua) in which the entry into the promised land is described. This makes Israel (enables Israel to be) forever a people that can live anywhere, focusing on torah in anticipation of God's fulfillment of the promise.

In the chapter on canonical hermeneutics, Sanders analyzes the hermeneutical principles that have been operative in the canonical process. The analysis involves locating the precursor materials in the passage (community traditions or international wisdom traditions) and then discerning the hermeneutic by which these traditions are adopted, represented, or resignified as the community seeks illumination (in a process Sanders calls comparative midrash). Sanders celebrates the fact that biblical writers made ample use of the wisdom of the peoples around them. This yields an underlying hermeneutic of God as creator of all peoples, as well as redeemer in Israel and in Christ, and enables the biblical witness to serve, depending on the need, as life-sustaining consolation (God has promised to sustain us and has) or as crushing indictment (when we particularistically exhibit pride of place). One of the things Sanders stresses frequently and emphatically is the diversity of the biblical message. This is seen as an inherent hermeneutic of self-correction, dashing any attempt to capture the final word from God (it was Marcion who wanted the Bible to speak with only one voice).

What ties together this pluralistic collection of traditions, interpreted pluralistically is the fact that biblical literature is a monotheizing literature that constantly seeks to give God the glory, here more clearly than there, but ever again seeks it. It is, for instance, more monotheizing in 2 Samuel 24, where Yahweh induces David to take a census and then punishes him for doing so than in 1 Chronicles 21, where Satan induces him to take the census for which he is punished. Sanders affirms that the story in 2 Samuel is harder for us to cope with, for it is within and against polytheistic contexts, both in antiquity and today, that the struggle to affirm God's oneness takes place.

Sanders concludes the book by calling for more attention to the hermeneutical process. We are to see how biblical

tradents, in the light of their own situation, used and modified the tradition or text being called upon, and, using the varied hermeneutical possibilities we discover, we are invited to discern a permissible hermeneutical range and then "have at it" ourselves.

Though the book is brief, it is a helpful introduction to canonical criticism. Those who wish to pursue this discipline's intricacies can read any of the dozen or so articles by Sanders mentioned in the book's footnotes and/or Childs' *Introduction* (plus two sets of reactions to Childs and his counter reactions in *Horizons in Biblical Theology* 2 [1980]: 113-211 and in the *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 16 [1980]: 2-60). I find myself sharing more of Sanders' criticisms of Childs than Childs' of Sanders. It is important to study the process as well as the canonical end product. And if the focus is to be on the end product, we cannot forget that there is not *one* end product. The Hebrew Bible, with its Masoretic text, is one end product, the Christian Old Testament as one part of the Christian Bible is another, not to mention that Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox Bibles do not have the same number of books. Incidentally, in this book and in other recent works Sanders himself is calling canonical criticism to devote more attention to the subject of the closure of the canon (for which his own work provides suggestive insights—recognition of canonization as a long process, emphasis on community usage, stress on diversity and flexibility).

Yet for all the truth of Sanders' assertion that neither as the Bible was in the process of formation nor after it was completed were the individual books read with "Childsean" preoccupation on the final form; and for all the truth of his additional assertion that the closure of the canon and fixing of the text did not stop the process of reinterpretation and reapplication but only modified its form—as true as these points are, I agree with Childs that the closing of the canon was much more significant than Sanders suggests (what Matthew did in using and reinterpreting Markan materials in writing his own gospel is materially different from a later interpreter's attempt to understand and apply Matthew's words as scripture). Moreover, canonical criticism is harder to define with Sanders than with Childs. First of all, to say that anything that is repeated is thereby somehow canonical is surely to stretch "canonical" or to overemphasize *somehow.* And secondly, since the process Sanders is advocating seems to utilize form criticism's attention to community interests, redaction criticism's interest in an author's or group's reapplication of earlier material, and literary criticism's interest in the text as it stands, it is not always clear what makes canonical criticism á la Sanders *distinctive.*

Those who today seek insight into God's truth and their own identity by applying and interpreting biblical traditions in the light of new situations can find in canonical criticism a valuable resource, both as it concentrates on the canonical process (with its attendant hermeneutic) and on the biblical message in its final form(s).

A Book Worth Discussing: Faith, Feminism, and the Christ.*

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The central question around which the content of this book revolves is this: given that the maleness of Jesus has been used symbolically to buttress the oppression of women, can a person be both a feminist and a Christian? The answer given by Patricia Wilson-Kastner is "yes."

The problem as this professor of homiletics at New York's General Theological Seminary sees it is that all the Christologies in the mainline Christian tradition appear to be tainted with strains of sexism, dualism, patriarchy, and a divisive spirit. The Chalcedonian commitment to the two natures Christology is a sham she says, because the Nestorian mood of separating spirit from body continued to dominate the church. This is important because according to the ancient mind men were identified with non-physical spirit whereas women were identified with the physical, the sexual, the emotional, and such lower dimensions of life. This means that the saving work of Christ applies to men of spirit but not to women of body. The consquence was that for women to share in salvation they had to identify themselves with the male gender. Today we recognize this as a form of cultural oppression, and it looks like the maleness of Jesus is a significant factor in this oppression.

The Episcopal priest's solution to the problem is found by stringently reaffirming the incarnation, emphasizing how fully God has become a part of the physical order of creation. That Jesus was a male and not a female diminishes in importance. "Christ is not simply the new male person, but one who shows all persons how to live." Jesus Christ represents the fulfillment of what makes us human, inclusive of both maleness and femaleness. After having said this, she then proceeds to develop the metaphor of "Jesus as our Mother" on the grounds that it would "affirm women's experience." In reading this I could not discern the links in the logic as the author moved from fullness of incarnation to the supra-gender inclusiveness of Jesus and then to the mother metaphor. Nevertheless, her intention is clear, namely, to make a positive affirmation regarding the gender inclusiveness of God's saving work in Jesus Christ.

In some ways we could dub Patricia Wilson-Kastner's book a work in "feminist postmodernism." Like other postmoderns, she attacks the mind of the modern scientific West because of its dualism between mind and matter,

By Patricia Wilson-Kastner. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983. 147 pages. Paper. $8.95.

humanity and nature, subject and object, etc. And like other feminists she blames this dichotomized thinking on the essentially spiritual male mind. Further, she defines "evil" as fragmentation and wholeness as the "triumph over fragmentation." Although she protests against those feminists who claim that women are essentially good and that only the male gender is responsible for sin in the world, the die is cast. The reader cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that solely the modern male is divisive and, hence, responsible for the world's evil. Feminism, in contrast, is holistic. It tries to overcome divisions and fragmentations. It seeks healing. Feminism is salvific.

The author does not mention that numerous non-feminists have made a similar analysis of the modern predicament and are also offering a holistic solution, e.g., revionist physicists, philosophers of science, systems theorists, mystical religions, parapsychologists, and holistic health advocates. Nevertheless, this is the premise on which she argues that she can be both a feminist and a Christian. God is holistic too. She ties this divine holism on one occasion to the cross and on another to the resurrection. She writes, "All the dualisms which divide, separate, cause pain, and support oppression and lack of communion with the other are gathered together at the crucifixion, and Christ received them." Later she shifts to the resurrection to reiterate: "The figure of Christ remains our central symbol: one of inclusiveness, healing, and living unity, which fulfills the expectation of feminism." In sum, because Christology is holistic and because feminism is holistic she can embrace both.

I personally endorse this vision and this conclusion. One needs to be a bit cautious regarding her implied theological method, however. The method seems to assume that the ideology of feminism has a pre-set standard or criterion by which everything else is to be measured. It is not subject to change. It is fixed and non-negotiable. Consequently, we proceed through the book to examine Christian symbols to see if they meet the feminist criterion. After testing numerous hypotheses we finally discover, much to our pleasure, that the cross and resurrection pass the test. A feminist can now become a Christian. Hooray! How relieved this makes a reader such as me! But, I might ask: could there ever be an occasion in which the Christian symbol might set the criterion by which the feminist ideology might be subjected to critique? Is it fair to ask: could a Christian in good conscience become a feminist? This methodological concern was not fully addressed.

This book causes me to ponder another item. I find it curious that the woman's liberation movement during the 1960s sought diligently to stamp out stereotypes that distinguished women (physical, affective, holistic) from men (mental, rational, divisive). This is because it was widely recognized that such stereotypes belong to the root of prejudice, and only by overcoming such prejudice could we insure equality between the sexes in the workplace. The feminist theologians of a decade later, however, began retrieving the stereotypes and frequently footnoting Carl Jung when doing so. Eternal masculine and feminine principles are now the stock and trade for feminist theology, an unexamined assumption in this work by Patricia Wilson-Kastner. This cannot help but be divisive in the long run, calling commitment to the doctrine of holism into question. Hence, we must ask if there might be a hernia

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
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


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running through this book's argument. If there really exists such a deep gulf between the genders, then how can the saving work of Jesus the male finally be inclusive? That the saving work of Jesus is inclusive I take as axiomatic. So does Patricia Wilson-Kastner. If we grant this as axiomatic, would this not lead us to challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the alleged gulf that exists between the genders? It would seem to me that this book should be augmented by another one in which the author might provide an argument for our full humanity in Christ—the new Adam and the new Eve—which represents the fullness awaiting all of us in the Kingdom of God.

I heartily recommend this book for two groups of readers. First, those who are not very familiar with feminist literature will benefit because the author opens the book with a clear and fair summary of various positions in the field. She does this to set the stage for her own argument. Second, those who already know the field well will benefit by reading a rather good exposition of the "reformist feminist" position, especially as it relates to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. All in all, it is a piece well worth taking the time to read.




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Book Reviews



ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YIGAEL YADIN. Edited by Geza Vermes and Jacob Neusner. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983. Volume XXXIII (1982) of *The Journal of Jewish Studies.* xvi and 602 pages. $45.00.

Two visits to Hazor are etched indelibly on this reviewer's memory. Each time Yigael Yadin excitedly informed us what was *about to be* uncovered, the corner of a Solomonic casemate city wall, and a huge water shaft. Each time he was correct, of course. Small wonder he was a formidable general in the army of independence and later Israel's Deputy Prime Minister!

Yigael Yadin overshadowed Israeli archaeology. The staff of his Hazor excavation in the late 50's reads like the *Who's Who* of the next two decades. His excavation at Masada was a national experience, with thousands of volunteers clearing this national monument. As head of the Hebrew University's Archaeological Institute he taught another generation of archaeologists. Many publications of scrolls from Qumran and the Dead Sea area were climaxed by the three volume *magnum opus* on the Temple Scroll.

Happily Yadin lived to receive this significant *Festschrift* before his death in June 1984. 39 scholars pay tribute. Their articles cover a rich and wide spectrum: "Archaeology and the Ancient Near East" (8 articles), "The Bible" (7), "The Intertestamental Period" (13), "Jewish History in the Hellenistic and Roman Eras" (9), and "Rabbinic and Medieval Literature and Jewish Thought" (9). This is fitting, for Yadin's published work dealt with all of these areas.

Carl Graesser, Jr.
Christ Seminary-Seminex
Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary
Berkeley, California

A HISTORY OF PASTORAL CARE IN AMERICA: FROM SALVATION TO SELF-REALIZATION. By E. Brooks Holifield. Nashville: Abindgon, 1983. 416 pages. Paper. $16.95.


At last we have an update and supplement to John T. McNeil's *A History of the Cure of Souls* (1951). Holified illustrates his book with excellent case material, extending back even to Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening. He chronicles the movement from the ideal of self-denial and other worldly salvation to an ethic of self-realization, and he keeps his finger on the pulse of Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Anglican, and Reformed traditions.


The author deals with the origins of the major movements on the American pastoral care scene. Many of the leading writers have responded to Sigmund Freud and Carl Rogers, but the person primarily responsible for the correlation of psychological concepts with theological concerns was Paul Tillich. He attempted to translate language about justification by grace through faith into the psychological idiom of the twentieth century. Tillich's student Wayne Oates helped theologians examine theological theories in light of Christian doctrines. Seward Hiltner and Wayne Oates were the first to question the link between theology and psychology as they turned to a study of the concrete activity of pastors at work.


The book's history of pastoral care in America really ends in the 1960's, by which time there was a realization that self-realization and spiritual formation were not necessarily the same thing. Thus theorists of pastoral care discovered that the Christian vision of salvation might well correct the cultural ideal of self-realization.

Paul R. Swanson
Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago

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WOMEN AND RELIGION IN AMERICA, VOLUME 2, THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY PERIODS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY. General editors, Rosemary Radford Ruether and Rosemary Skinner Keller. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983. xxi and 434 pages. Cloth. $24.95.

Volume 2 maintains the high standards set by Volume 1. The documents cited in this volume range from 1669 to 1793 and are carefully chosen and of extreme value. In the judgement of this reviewer, they are the heart of the book and must be read to capture the real thrust of the accompanying essays. The historical research and writing are well done in every case, although there is variation in aims and goals from writer to writer.

The book is far more than a history of the role of women; it is a major cultural history of the eighteenth century. It turns out that women make excellent foils to understand so much of what was unpleasant and undesirable in emerging American life and culture in that time. This reviewer found the essays by Keller to be especially cogent and helpful. Abigail Adams, not surprisingly, emerges as the strongest female figure in this period, closely followed by Mary Wollstonecraft and Priscilla Mason. Anyone who wants to understand the soul of the United States then and now is urged to read this book.

Herbert T. Mayer
Pilgrim Lutheran Church
St. Louis, MO

EDUCATION MINISTRY IN THE CONGREGATION. By Norma J. Everist. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1983. 222 pages. Paper. $10.95.

A superb book by a gifted and dedicated mother, pastor/educator and seminary professor. Norma Everist is assistant professor of educational ministry at Wartburg-Dubuque.

This very readable text deals wholistically with the overall educational ministry of a parish. Topics include: presentation, worshiping community, discussion, inductive study, individualized learning, confrontation and clarification, experiential/learning, and the journal.

The book sparkles with down-to-earth experiences of teachers and real-life application while at the same time reflecting the latest insights in learning theory and educational research. It is a helpful companion to Donald Griggs' *Teaching Teachers to Teach* (Abingdon) in my basic Christian Education course and will continue to be a required text. Need I say more?

I will. This book is not just for seminary profs but for everyone involved in the educational ministry of the parish. "Ultimately this book is for and about the whole congregation, because teaching and learning involves all of the people, whether they know it or not." (p. 12).

It should be in every church library.

Donald L. Deffner
Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary
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On Serving Two Masters

Walter M. Stuhr
President, Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary

A Lutheran seminary's specific *purpose* is determined by its church sponsorship. However, the *structure* by which it fulfills that purpose is determined by its identity as an institution of higher education. Many of the tensions and anomalies associated with seminaries are inherent in that distinction, e.g., faculty challenged to be pastors as well as professors; students contending with expectations of both candidate for ordination and graduate student; curricula that must be appropriate for both ordination and graduate degree requirements.

A popular perception is that seminaries would be freer to serve the churches' purpose if they were less bound by their academic structure. And I suppose each of us could give examples that support that perception. However, in these paragraphs I would like to show how the seminary's being accountable to its academic identity can actually undergird its fulfillment of the church's purpose.

In addition to preparing for renewal of its accreditation by the Association of Theological Schools (ATS), Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary is seeking initial accreditation by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (WASC). By agreement with ATS, we will be accountable primarily to WASC standards, with the exception of the curricula, where ATS standards will be the point of reference. In either case it is standards which pertain to PLTS as an institution of higher education that apply.

I see the process of academic accreditation undergirding the church's purpose from the seminary in two ways. *First,* it submits the seminary to a rigorous, professional, third party evaluation on the basis of criteria that also measure its effectiveness in doing what the church expects it to do.

The purpose of accreditation, according to the WASC *Handbook of Accreditation,* is to insure that an institution,

> has clearly defined educational objectives ... has established conditions under which achievement of the objectives can reasonably be expected, appears in fact to be accomplishing them substantially, and is so organized, staffed, and financed that it can be expected to continue to achieve these objectives. (p. 1)

Consider the criteria impact in this statement of purpose:

1. *Clearly defined educational objectives.* The Seminary should be absolutely clear itself about its objectives and their relative priority, and should have stated these objectives so that they are equally clear to their primary clients/consumers—students and the churches. [Note: WASC acknowledges that "an institution may take as one of its primary functions the development in students of attitudes, interpretations, and skills relating to or consistent with specific beliefs." (p. 16)]
2. *Conditions conducive to the achievement of the objectives.* The seminary should have assembled the curricula, faculty, and facilities which are necessary for the achievement of its objectives.

3. *Evidence that the objectives are indeed being achieved.* The seminary should be able to demonstrate to an outside observer that it is accomplishing "substantially" that for which it seeks and accepts support/tuition.
4. *Possession of and access to resources sufficient to assure continued achievement of its objectives into the foreseeable future.* Since accreditation is normally for a ten year period, future stability is as important a consideration as past performance and present solvency.

Given these criteria, the relevance of accreditation is not confined to the seminary's colleagues in "academia". A finding that the seminary measures up to the expectations of an institution of higher education should bolster the church's confidence in it; failure to measure up, however, is cause for the church to question the seminary's effectiveness.

Second, accreditation puts the church's own support of the seminary under scrutiny. Has the church provided the financial resources that assure faculty, staff and facilities adequate to the programs by which the seminary's objectives are being pursued? Are the financial resources dependable enough to assure continued adequacy of personnel and facilities?

Academic accrediting agencies come right to the point about the connection between academic excellence and sound financing. In so doing they challenge the church to be equally straightforward about the connection between excellent preparation for ordained ministry and sound financing. It also emphasizes the importance of the issue of how seminaries will be financed in the new Lutheran church—importance for the *quality of ordained leadership* in the new church.

Without denying the tensions and anomalies involved, there are important ways in which the church is well served by the seminary's structural accountability to higher education.

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